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There have been various academic attempts to understand state-
society relationship in contemporary China, through investigations on 
shop floor and rural context. These different efforts are targeted on 
different parts of the variegated empirical world, thus concluding with 
pieces of contradictory contentions. It is the aim of this thesis to 
synthesize, reconcile these contradictions and to compile as well as 
elaborate them into a coherent discourse on the basis of empirical case 
studies scattered in the country's rural areas.-
To develop an encompassing thesis on government-peasant 
relationship in Post-Mao reform era, three typical patterns of 
relationship are proposed namely, coercive ritualism, disintegrated 
autonomy and reactionary subsistence. These constructions seek to 
generate a wider perspective than the prevailing lopsided and 
oversimplified versions of debilitated state or autonomous society. At 
the outset, the defining features of the three are summarily described. 
Coercive ritualism is characterised by a configuration in which weak 
peasants are associated with either a strong government or a strong 
middleman and a weak government. For the disintegrated autonomy, the 
government, the middleman and the peasant are embedded in a 
disintegrated ci rcumstances so that the three of them are weak in 
relation to one another. What the reactionary subsistence attempts to 
capture is a strong peasant, society accompani<si with either a weak 
government or a weak government and strong middleman. 
This would then tx» followt-d by a meticulous evaluation of th»» 
<•(>n
,
»'six>rying conditions that, aro identifi<*i to closely related with 
the respective types. rhese conditions include the nature of 
agricultural policies, the level of agricultural collectivity, the level 
of commercialisation and some local peculiarities. The ultimate concern 
is to a relationship between the relevant constellation of these 
conditions find the respective types of government-peasant relationship. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Reforms in state socialist countries in recent years have 
undubiously aroused concern over its formal as well as substantial 
reaches, impacts and consequences.* Presumably, the socialist countries, 
widely deemed to be an empirical exemplary of the totalitarian model, is 
contended to undergo a retrenchment of state power and capacity with a 
corresponding activating of societal impetus during and in the wake of 
reforms.^  Nonetheless, the dynamics of state-society interaction is so 
intricate that the reform contents, societal contexts and its historical 
specificity have structured and even complicated the state-society 
relationship^ , rendering the reference frame of the nature of society 
being 'socialist'** almost futile. 
Empirically, contradictory phenomena are witnessed in rural China 
in recent decades after decollectivisation. There is an impression that 
peasants are permitted considerable autonomy in making their decisions 
in production in particular and economic activities in general. Cases a3 
abuses of power by local rural cadres, rural cadres' usurpation of 
peasant resources, collusion or alliance between cadres and peasants, 
1. For 3 selection of essays on the transformation of institutional structure in socialist 
countries, cee Nee, v.' v st ark, D. ( ed. ) Remarking the Economic Institution* of 
Socialism: China ind Lastcm Europe Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. 
2. TBOU, T. , " Back from the Brink of Revol ut i onar y- Feudal Totalitarianism," in See, v. t 
Mozi ngo, 0. ( »d. ) S±J±it and S<?ci?tr in C^ llLt JBP9 r a r y SHua Ithaca: Cornell university 
Press, 1994. 
J. For the existence of web-lik« society to distort state power and capacity, see vatd.il 
J-S. 2,11 <2 flj 2<?C1 rllgJi sLQil—hSL3_K iLiLLSJU. atate-19Ci e t y relatioqafrtp and staty 
capabilities in the Third Wrld Princeton: Princeton University Press, loss. 
t. For the diversity of socialist countries which are disputed in their stages of 
historical retreat and iU denu*, s*e Bf»i<-ii ntki !.. Lhi^ ifjQd Failure; T.ht 8t r \ U 
4fl.'i St.il n. •.rl._.Cff.3a«Ufti. 5 a..L.a_Ult-.tiS.ali jM tuCCJll SI Li. Vork: Col I I er Books, nv 0. 
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etc, are not a rare scene. Ruthless control over villages by the state 
or by cadres is discerned concomraitantly with some weightily suppressed 
activities felt to be incompatible with socialist ideology. 
Paradoxically enough, while recognising the fact that the cadres may 
occupy advantageous positions in local villages, it has been reported 
that rural cadres are difficult to be recruited as many are not willing 
to become mediators between the government and peasants. The intents of 
this thesis are three fold. Firstly, it seeks to provide a coherent view 
on the seemingly contradictory picture. Secondly, it attempts to 
illuminate on the current debate on state-society relationship in post-
Mao reform era by substantiating respective views with corresponding 
conditions, with particular focus on rural Chinese society. Finally, 
typical patterns that are theoretically informed to state-society 
relationship are constructed. 
Cases of institutional politics in rural China since the reform 
era are employed to illustrate the above. There is first a brief review 
on the literature.about state-society relationship in regard to the 
contemporary rural China politics in this chapter. The arguments as well 
as researches of the literature are placed in three theoretical 
perspectives* find the possible weaknesses of the respective perspective 
will be ascertained then. 
The intention of formulating these synthesized perspectives is to 
delineate the circumference within which current literature; pertinent to 
1. These three theoretical ptrsp.cti v.s are synth.ti :t«J not necessarily according to «,rkt 
of Afferent scholars, but to the nature of arguments anil focus. Definite auiual 
osclusivii) of the perspect. ve* woul.l not be u t r I c 11 > adhered lo though different 
l.i n<l», of a r £ ume nl s can !>e vi g ual i * <1 .rudely ( r o a di f f - r - n t perspectives. 
c. 
this issue is to be explored. The subsequent chapters are devoted to the 
elaboration of the three typical patterns in light of the empirical 
materials; both time, space distribution and the description of 
conditions under which the ideal types flourish will be discussed. (This 
ensuing chapters will vindicate this part empirically.) 
The agricultural reform or the so-called decollectivisation of 
agriculture has been featured with a wide array of instances, such as 
household responsibility system, specialised households and rural 
enterprises in later years. Contradictory or even sometimes conflicting 
theoretical perspectives accounting for the variegated reality can be 
synthesized under three headings, namely - neo-institutionalism, 
clientelism and localism. 
A Brief Literature Review 
As a comparative perspective,^  the emphasis of neo-
o 
institutionalisnr is on the allocative mechanisms such as market and 
collective.
3
 A rather simple interpretation of neo-institutionalism is 
1. The sense of c o np»r iti ve .pe r s pec t i ve refers to that of the socialist countries, see 
Stark, D. i Nee V. "Toward an Institutional Anal ysi s of State Socialism" in Nee, V. I 
Stark, D. ( ed. ) op.cit., 19S9. 
2. Neo-i nst i t ut i onal i nm as a perspective in the context of the t r a nu f o r ma 11 o n of agrarian 
institutions can be found in Levi M. "The Transformation of Agrarian Institutions: 
an introduction and perspective" PQ] T t i CB 1 SociM y 16, no.2-3 (19SS). 
3. Ano t he r line of analysis following neo-institutionalismis the borrowing of transaction 
cost approach in discussing state-farmer relationship. In short, their 
relationship is governed by their relative bargaining power, their transaction 
costs (costs of monitoring and enforcing polices), and t ho discount rates. This 
would not be dealt with in detail here. Tor details, see Levi, H. Of SilL* iJl'J 
H t v * n 'j » ( Derkrl f y t-'ni «> r i I > of CjI i form j Press, 11 s S ) . 
3 
the theory of market transition in state socialism.
1
 It contends that 
state socialism at its transformative stage would experience an 
expansion of marketlike sector, which is regarded as the second economy 
in state socialist economies. Producers can conduct their business in a 
zone relatively autonomous from the state, though the second economy 
still lacks a fully legitimated and well-defined private property 
rights.^ The theory of market transition postulates three sub-theses, 
namely, market power thesis, market incentive thesis and market 
opportunity thesis. It propounds the increase of peasant power, as 
indicated by the growth of household income. As-direct producers, they 
can now appropriate larger share of surplus from the market, relative to 
the state distributive sector. This is indeed the simplest and most 
basic proposition of neo-institutionalism. 
To expound further, it states that the transition to a market-like 
economy can stimulate the growth of economic institutions with greater 
specialization in transactive exchanges."
1
 The state, by establishing a 
contractural relationship between state and village, can limit its 
1. V. , "A Theory of Market Transition: From redistribution to markets in state 
social isn", African Sociological Review 1939, vol.54 Oct. 
2. Tbe second economy in stale socialist China includes all i ncome-ge ne r a t i ng activity 
outside the boundaries of the s t a t o-r eg ul a t e d and managed economy, i ncl udi ng 
private construction, manufacturing, commerce, services, moo nl i c bt t ng for private 
gains, s t c. 
3. As Stark puts it,"The boundaries of the socond economy and the relative proportions of 
its legal, illegal and al egal parts are products of contestation of state and 
society - a continuously changing outcome of a struggle in which society attempts 
to create and maintain a sphere of activity relatively autonomous from the state**. 
3t ar k, D. , " Towar ds an Institutional Analysis of State Socialism", in See,Y. I 
St ark, D. ( ed. ) op. ci t. ( 1 9 S V ) . 
I. see. v. t Sijin, S,, "Institutional Changes and Econoeac Growth in China: The view from 
the villages" •L9_UJLQ-£J \i-Li ILiLyilUfJl no. I t> b 19 90. 
•I 
arbitrary power in interfering directly the village economic activity.* 
The redrawing of state-village boundary may extricate state control from 
agricultural production, resulting in the subsequent lowering of 
transaction costs. The property rights can be further consolidated, and 
the resultant integral structure is in turn favourable to economic 
growth. 
N'eo-institutional discussion does not entirely overlook the 
o 
possible social embeddedness of economic action, though this appears to 
be merely the peripheral concern amid its foci. It admits that though 
there are reforms in rural bureaucracy, the activities of rural cadre 
o 
can impose negative impact on the village household income. Insofar as 
cadre activities are prevailing in the villages,** the fruits of 
commercialisation of agricultural would be easily exploited. 
Another attempt serves to restrict the application of 
straightforward version of neo-institutional argument. (This 
straightforward argument states that the development of market economy 
can act as a base for an autonomous society favourable to economic 
1. The arfiunent that a civil oociety could never do it alone but requires state power to 
actively defend its independence can be found in Keane J. Pe b*?c r ac y i ad Ci vi I 
Societ v London: Yerso, 1959. 
2. For a succinct account of such kind of ICODONC action, please see Granovetter Mark, 
"Economic action and social structure: the problem of eabvddedneat", Anw r I c^ q 
j_2.m_n.il 2aci9l?iy v«" • »»• 
J. Nee, v. i Younfi r. w, "Peasant Entrepreneurs in China's second Economy: an institutional 
».It has to be potntod out that wh-t l tie cadre activities are are not thoroughly covered 
in the « i u.d y. 
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growth.The improved version specifies that the state's capability to 
intervene society would be weakened or even distorted by local or 
individual interests. This happens when the social groups can 
successfully gain access to the state power and succeed in the 
manoeuvre. The state capacity and autonomy is undoubtedly enmeshed in 
the Guanxi networks in which the state interests would be misplaced. For 
the neo-institutionalists, this is only regarded as an inevitable stage 
of organizational recalcitrance. It is maintained that ultimately, the 
reforms will bring forward a clear-cut and exclusive restructuring of 
state-society boundary. 
Another line of neo-institutionalism concerns whether or not and 
in what ways the collective have been affected by the rural reform. The 
main focus still lies on the implications of institutional 
reconstitution or dismantlement. Decollectivisation or decommunization 
o 
(in Shue's wordings)^ has been inferred to such a great extent that it 
denotes the transformation of rural villages into companies and 
corporation. It is disputed that a contractual basis between state and 
peasant relations will be installed by the responsibility system. Some 
may assume that the collective ownership of agriculture has even lapsed 
away.'
5
 It is contended that there is a comprehensive adoption of 
different kinds of responsibility systems, though the form adopted 
1.Nee,Y."Peasant Ent repreneurshi p and t be politics of regulation in China' in Nee, V. I 
Stark, D. («d. ) op.cit., 1989. 
2. Shue, V. , ~ The Fate of Consume" Mo de r n Chi D J vol.10 no. 3 July 1994. 
3. Hartford, X."Socialist agriculture is dead; long live socialist agriculture; 
organizational t r a n s f o r ma 11 o n in rural China" in Perry, E.J., Uon(, C.(ed.) 
fLfiJj_LLiJ.! IJL2.02_«UL_J>1 FjSJLgJJ8_.l_a foat-Mao China ( Ca»i>r i dtr: Harvard University 
Pr<".t, ivi',) , 
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varies in different districts.
1
 In this instance, the straightforward 
equation between the decollectivised agriculture and the establishment 
of total autonomous village community has been consciously and evidently 
reserved. Lastly, it has to be reiterated that the entire analytical 
concern (whether the locus of control over the villages is the state or 
the local bases) is solely along the line of reorganisation of 
institution - the collective. 
o 
The premise of clientelism^ plays a prominent role in informing, 
in particular, the peasant studies. Based on the research in South East 
Asia, Scott^  attests the existence and the subsequent evolution of the 
patron-client ties between landlord and peasant brought forward by the 
commercialisation of agriculture. One maintains that the peasants' 
position had been made more vulnerable to the patrons' usurpation 
because the insecure economy put the peasants in a precarious arid 
involuntary dependence on the patrons, albeit is more diversified in 
1.Unger J. , "The decol 1 ec t i vi s at i on of the Chinese countryside: a survey of twenty-eight 
vi Mates" Paci f i c Af f ai rs 1935-96 no. 4 vol.39. 
2.A rather abstract and theoretical discussion on patron-client relations has been put 
forward by S. N. Ei senst adt, Louis Roniger, "Patron-client Relations as a Model of 
Structuring Social Exchange" Comparative Studies in Society and History vol.22 
no. 1 Jan. 19S0. This is further elaborated in 3. N. Ei se ns t adt, L. Roniger, Pat rons. 
clients and f r i ends: ) 'nUrP?rS9Pa| relations and the structure of trust in society 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
3. For an early discussion of subsistence ethic and the parallel patron-client 
relationship, see Scott,J. I&c tt?ral Econopiy of Peasant; Rebellion and Subsistence 
in Sout beast Asia New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. For a focus on the 
impact of commercialisation on the patron-client relationship, see Scott, J. "The 
Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social change in Rural Southeast Asia" in 
Journal of Ast an St udi rs vol . XXXI I no. 1 Nov. 1972. A counter discussion of aoral 
economy can be found in Popkin, S. The Rational Peas?^; Political Economy sX 
S.UJLA1 19C1.?.V> Lfl-JOJCJJIJLS Berkeley: University of California Press, p>79. lor a 
m* t ho dog I e al synthesis of the Moral economy and rational peasant, see li 111 e D. , 
Vadtrslaji<JLJUL-.ES-A5«JLL_CJH n * j L _ _ £ _ a h U _ g j i ^ ^ i L y of a0c 1 a 1 •  1 <• nc- New 
Haven: Y.«lr University Prrs-!, 19S'». 
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nature. 
Nevertheless, the implanting of patron-client relation in the 
discussions of local politics at the grass root level in rural China* 
o 
and at the shop floor only starts in the recent decade. Instead of 
focussing on the institution as an analytical concern, this perspective 
appears to magnify the micro-interaction between peasants and local 
cadres who are assumed to be the patrons possessing requisite resources. 
On the basis of household registration system, peasants are anchored in 
the collective. This enables team leaders to possess leverage over 
peasants before decollectivisation. The arguments further assume that 
cadres' power is not so much eroded away as diversified among various 
o 
resource channels created after decollectivisation. This kind of 
dependency is not a one-sided relationship (that is, total reliance of 
peasants on cadres), as it does not preclude the possibility of passive 
resistance. In fact, the forms of resistance by peasants and collusion 
among peasants and cadres take forms in great variety.^ 
The third perspective to state-society relationship in rural China 
l.Oi.J.C. state and Peasant in Contemporary China: the Political economy of village 
iiovernroent Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
2. wai tier, A. a. Conwuni si Neo-Tr adi t i onal i sw work and Authority in Chinese industry 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
3. For details, please see Oi , J . C. " Fr o a Cadres to Middlemen: The co nine r c i al i s a t i o n of rural 
tovernnent" P.r<? t>| 1133 .9 f CgBfflUnisa 3ept-0ct, 1996; "Peasant households between plan 
and market: cadre control over agricultural inputs" Modern Chi na 12, no. 2 April 
199&; "Market Refora and Corruption in Rural China" St udi f a in Coaparat i ve 
Co saaJU 5 a vol . XXI I no. 2 '3 summer / aut uan, 1999. 
4. Scott, J. C. "Everyday foras of resistance" in Col burn, F. D. (ed.) Ever yda> fornsa <? f peasaq.y_ 
I-£-Si a.vancjg. Vow York: M. C. Sbar pe , l nc. 19S9. ro have » more -.pecific treatment in 
rural China, can -.ec C. D. "Strucflin* over land in China: feasant Resistance 
»ft « r collectivisation, 1 'J ft 6 - S ft " , i t>i •!. 
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is local ism, which adopts a rather macro framework. A typical exposition 
can be found in Shue's work.* It adopts an intelligible dichotomy of 
state and localism, which attempts to capture the phenomenon of local 
self-subsistence against state intrusion of any kind. Historically and 
geographically rooted local interests, gentry as well as peasants, would 
persistently act as a buffer diluting the penetration of imperial state 
action. It is disputed that in communist China, the institutions of 
collectivized structure such as commune, production brigade, production 
team and cumbersome administrative as well as party hierarchies have 
only reinforced the solidification of local interests. The overlapping 
of such vertical, horizontal party and governmental structures has made 
it difficult for state pol icies to be implemented at the lowest rural 
level, which is consequently, at the discretion of locality, or more 
exactly, the interests of team leaders and peasants together.^  
The logical account of state-society relationship in the post-Mao 
reform era, based on the above analysis, contends the intended state 
attempts to strengthen state capacity in the locality. This is achieved 
by specifying definitely the scope of state jurisdiction as opposed to 
the private sphere. It is distinct from the formerly well-researched 
proposition that the intended state action performs as a retrenchment of 
l.Shuc.V. The ftgflCh 9 f lUJuSl SKmhtg Of thf Chi ne5> Rp.jy Politic Stanford; Stanford 
University Press, 1999. 
2.This argument has its historical tfround albeit in a modified version. It is contended 
that the rural communities would experience a period of cyclical open structure 
and closure during the period of i nterdynas11c chaos. The pro<ressi ve closure of 
village local system, typ.fied as localism, would be a rational response to an 
unstable and t hreateni nt envi ron»ent. Conversely, t he procressi ve opem n* up of 
village community has al r.o represented a rational response to a stable and benitn 
envi ronoent. lor detail,, Be* Skinner U. w. "Chinese Peasants and the Closed 
Community: an open ..hut case- <;<?r . ve , n sori'M* jjut U l -, t o r v 
vol . n i n , 
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governmental power. The argument of localism maintains that local 
automony is restricted and structured by the policies of 
decolloctivisation. As a result, the local configuration may facilitate 
further state control and penetration. 
However, the intended expansion of state machinery and apparatus 
would engender an anarchic situation whereby the state is beyond its 
capability to command.* Such experience is found to be the case in the 
early decades of this century in North China where the expansion of the 
power of the Chinese state was concoinmitant to the growing anarchy in 
local society. State involution is named after this situation since 
state organisations expand not through the increasingly efficient use of 
existing administrative resources but through the replication, extension 
of the inherited pattern. This renders the sustenance of command over 
local society by the state intrinsically difficult. 
Beforing proposing the construction of state-society relationship 
that lays the framework for the ensuing analysis, one has to underscore 
the shortcomings of the literature and research mentioned above in the 
discourse of state-society relationship. For the neo-institutionalism, 
the emphasis is positioned on the impact of dismantlement and 
revitalisation of such allocative mechanisms as collective and market, 
which are assumed to structure the relationship lx?tween state and 
peasant intermediately. It is not to renounce their strengths in 
l.This Jrjuwnl is based on the study of local finances in North China, 1911-15. Although 
the period i s not in the communist era or in the post-Mao reform era, iht 
situation depicted ma y generate insights on the state-society interface. See, 
Duar a. P. AJlji UlT »VMl >_9ftt) Chin J. 1VQQ-U St anf or d: 
Stanford University press, 1'iSS. 
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depicting such relationship here.
1
 However, it has to lie highlighted 
that it is a lopsided predilection for equating market and autonomous 
society, which indeed comprises a wide array of institutions. 
For the clientelism, evidently, the interaction between local 
cadres and peasants has been amplified to such an extent that this sole 
relationship is assumed to capture the state-peasant relationship. The 
clientelistic relationship may govern the acquisition of means of 
production and the sale of produces or products. One may be interested 
in ascertaining the extent of domains of peasant life that may be 
affected by the cadres at this juncture. For the localism, the easy 
cooperation and collective action of local community against state 
action at whatever circumstances is its apparent conclusion. Alliance or 
collusion between local cadres and peasants is presumed to be formed 
amicably and state action seems to be regarded as infringing their 
interests collectively. The loose dichotomy between localism and state 
is propounded at the expense of the necessary attention to the internal 
diversity and heterogeneity among different groupings or even within 
them. 
To come to grips with the government-peasant
2
 relationship, the 
l.In fact, the origin of idea of civil society nay bo regarded as laying in a complex of 
autonomous institutions - economic, religious, intellectual and political 
distinct from the family, the clan, the locality and the state. Tor details, see 
Shi Is Edward, -The Virtue of Civil Society- G^ vgfnacat t Qpposl lion vol . 26 no. 1 
wt nter 1991. 
2."Government-peasant relationship" is adopted here to elaborate the relationship instead 
of the notion of s t a t e - Pe a s a n t relationship, which say connote a less concrete 
meaning for a n a I v •» i <s. 
11 
following diagram may help demonstrate the situation. Mediating between 
state and peasant there are three types of meso fabric: organisation, 
local leaders and resources. That means, state capacity over peasant may 
be constrained or enabled by the respective actors in these three 
domains. Consequently, these meso fabric may be regarded as the means 
through which the government exercises its control. 
Fig. 1 Govt-peasant Government 
relationship 
/ : \ 
/ : \ 
organistations local leaders resources 
acquisition &. 
manipulation 
.government .state .. .state 
organisations payroll stipulation 
.economic .local .negotiation &. 
organisations payroll regulation 
.social .independent .contract 
organisations revenue 
sources 
\ I / 
V 1 / 
\ : / 
peasant* 
The above diagram exhibits the relationship between the government 
and peasants. The supposition is, different combinations of 
organisation, local leaders and resources acquisition and manipulation 
can lead to different types of government-peasant relationship. Prior to 
l. To have an elaboration of peasant society with special reforence to the concept of civil 
society anil public sphere in the China contest, see Strand D."Protest in Beijtnf: 
civil society and Public Sphere in China" vol. XXXI X May June 
1910. 
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constructing the possible types of government-peasant relationship, it 
would be useful to elucidate what the meso fabric alludes to. Political 
organisation refers mainly to the governmental and party hierarchies. In 
the post-Mao reform era, the lowest level that is legitimately vested 
with governmental structure is the township government (xiang). The 
reforms that separated political and economic authority and established 
new local political structures began in 1982 in accordance with the 
Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China. With the 
abolition of communes, production brigades and production teams, a new 
structure had been instituted. The new political structures below county 
level include the township, the administrative village and village 
groups, and each corresponds to former administrative division of and 
within the commune. The following figure illustrates the changes.
1 
l.This ts extracted from Crol I J. Elizabeth. "Reform. Local Political I n.t i t ut, on. and the 
VI I I.e. Economy ,n Ch, na" in vol.3 Dec 19.7 no. 4. , n 
fact. th.re are certain local organisation with political affiliation.. e< 
ComAuni st Vouth League, mU.tia, b u t , hfl | r l n p o r t a n c , ha„ d r „ t, ^ 
These would not t>e dealt with specifically here. 
1-1 
Fig. 2 Local Administrative Structure 
Chinese Terms English Terms Past Equivalent 
X i an Coun ty Coun ty 
; (County Government) J 
i * i 
i < i 
X i ang Towns hip Commune 
; (Township Government) J 
i • i 
i > i 
Xingzhengcun Administrative Village Production 





Cunmin Xiaozu Village Group Production 
(Village leader) team 
The economic organisations comprise recently formed institutions 
oriented to production or auxiliary to production considerations, which 
include economic/supply cooperatives
1
 (supplying chemical fertilizer, 
pesticide, tractors, combine harvestor, etc.), commune enterprises 
(later renamed as rural enterprises since the abolition of conmunes), 
horizontal economic cooperations (cooperation with organisation back up 
1. Some nane it as cooperative store or supply and niarketing cooperative, see Chi na Sews 
Anal ysi s. vol. 1259 April 23 1934, Chi na News Anal vsi s. vol. 1251 January 2 1984. 
Initially, the cooperative store is linked to the national commercial network, 
never to release it to fulfil its role for the peasant, its original shareholder. 
It is resurked by Fei Xiatong as the lowest rung of the State monopoly. However, 
it has experienced some changes. A Report froa the Policy Rtstirch Office of the 
Henan Province Party Comnattee has remarked that to survive in the co«*>etition 
with the economic unions and joint agri cul t ur al-cosuaerce ventures, the cooperative 
store should take initiatives in seeking markets and suppliers, to multiply 
services, to set up networks of smalt stores, to create mutual help associations, 
to protect conm»rcl al entrepreneurs. In a nutshell, t h* cooperative store has 
(hanged from J aw r e state extension of peasant s.rvice provision to an 
orjantiation active in econosac coordination. 
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from sa/ne industries), vertical economic cooperations (cooperation for 
easy access to market, various means of production), cooperatives among 
professional households and specific households. Indeed, some are 
monopolized and statist in nature (economic/supply cooperatives) while 
others are voluntary and private in nature. 
The social organisations, voluntary in nature, include lineage 
organisations which are common in south but not north China.
1
 Their 
existence may be latent until need for mobilized action arises when 
there are conflicts among lineages. The institution of communes, 
production brigades and teams incorporates these geographically rooted 
organisations, rendering the cooperations and conflicts among lineages 
latent. Their transparence augments with the restructuring of local 
artificial institutions. 
Insofar as the governmental organisations overpower other 
organisations, governmental power can be exercised to the fullest of its 
potential. At the other end of the continuum, governmental power is at 
its lowest where social organisations infuse both governmental and 
economic associations. Thus, variables of nominal scale (that is, 
categorical classification) can possess the characteristics of ordinal 
scales simultaneously. 
Different payroll structure of local rural cadres suggests 
disparate reach of state capacity. State-paid administrative personnel, 
{.Publication* m China would retard party conmttee, postal and cousuni c at t on office, 
village com t t ee, econosac cooperatives, etc as social organisations, w* t h very 
ffw excepti oDti t h» y ac* all fraught with party politics. Therefore, they are not 
treated as voluntary io«ial organisation* here. 
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state cadres, are rarely found beneath the town/township government 
level. As such, cadres at township level are prone to rely on the state 
hierarchical structure for promotion. They thus act more as agents of 
state than representatives of their villages.* 
For the brigade and team leaders (those at administrative village 
level and village group level), their wage and grain rations come from 
the village treasury. Their emolument is highly dependent on the 
collective performance of the village. After the abolition of communes, 
former brigades, village cadres are vested with power to directly 
administer peasants. Their power ranges from administering contracts, 
allocating jobs, to the delivery of former collective tractors, 
machines, etc.
2
 Their reliance on the government gradually lessen.
3 
The newly emerged local leaders are part and parcel of the recent 
dynamic changes. Possessing the necessary access to resources through 
networks, connections or other means, they are mostly former cadres, who 
get rich soon after decollectivisation. They occupy important positions 
in both the economic and political arena with their cadre background. 
With their rather independent sources of income in the market 
transactive sector, they become autonomous in relation to the government 
and the village. (Their earnings may still come partly from the state 
1. Thi s Wind of state-viI I ale tul-of-war dynamics wt t h the interface on positions of local 
cadre can be found in the elaborations in Huang, p. c. C. The Feasant Kara I y an<] 
BJLLi Pt
v
*l 9Plwnt in \ he Yanlli Delta. 1330-n?^  Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1990. 
2. 01 , J. C. ( 19 39) op. CL t . 
J. Thi s would be especially so when the production t earn coi net de« with the boundary of 
natural villages, which can informally influence the selection of team leaders. 
This can be found in Hua ya m <|i ao, r.oe Huan< P. C. C. (1990) ibid. 
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redistributive sector or from local village, but it has to be pinpointed 
that their positions are being inflated by their overlapping though 
quite independent positions.) 
In resources acquisition and manipulation, the greatest 
governmental control is in the monopoly for the purchase and sale of 
grain (tongou tongxiao). The market is deliberately suppressed, which 
some term as state stipulation. The monopolised purchase and sale of 
grain was commonly in early state policies in the 50's. Peasants' 
agricultural harvest was arranged under effective .government control and 
extraction.* 
Negotiated price for agricultural produce has been introduced to 
supplement the monopoly in purchase and sale. Grain left after the 
unified purchase and sales can be sold in market. Surplus grain can be 
released to the state at "negotiated price", which are set higher than 
the price of unified purchase but possibly lower than the market price.
2 
The quantum of governmental control over peasants allowed in such 
negotiation and bargaining would be medium, between that of state 
stipulation and market. 
l.It has been analysed that peasant resistance is dependent on four factors. namel y, 
ideology, personnel, rural structure and campai gns. This f rawwork is applied in 
the context of revolutionary China. For details, see Zwei g, D. "Struttl i n< over 
Land in China: Peasant Reai stance after Collectivisation, 1908-86" in Col burn F. D. 
(ed.) 19 9 9, op.cit. One may challenge in what ways and under what context the 
state policies have been actually implemented in rural context. It nuy be further 
propounded that peasants only reacted to each policies according to their 
personal, family and collective Interests. The policy i mpl eaent at 1 on details in 
rural China are uncovered since 1949, in Zwel g, P.Agrarian Radical! am in n?, 
1903-199 1 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
2. This is accentuated in "Document Ho. 1, 19S4" which stipulates the contraction of unified 
and mandatory state purchases of agricultural commodities and the expansion of 
"negotiated purchases". Tor details, see Ash, H. F. " T he Evolution of Agricultural 
Policy- Chi na imr! ?r I > net liss no. sir,. 
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As the government abandons its monopolistic procurement of 
agricultural products in the reform era, the adoption of contract is 
given formal expression.
1
 With the advent of household responsibility 
system, contract agreement among peasants or between cadres and peasants 
shows growing importance in accounting for the respective terms of 
cooperation and responsibilities. In effect, the state retreat to a 
residual role and acts only to guarantee the procurement of grain and 
o 
cotton under signed contracts. It can be ascertained that state control 
over agricultural commodities is the lowest in contractual and market 
1. The meaning of contract adopted in China would require further explanation, which may be 
distinct from that of the sense in market economy in general. A case of contract 
in Anhui Province may help illustrate its meaning. The main features of the 
contract include: first, the implication of an engagement by the administration to 
assure the redistribution of a specific quota of income, second, the 
responsibility of the producer to fulfill the quota category imposed by the state 
yearly agricultural planning and third, the contractural protections enjoyed by 
the farming unit and its members from interference in their productive tasks. 
Chi na vews Anal ysi s vol.1251 January 2, 1984. It can be maintained that contracts 
only delimit the production boundary between state and peasants, who may subject 
to less arbitrary state interference. The protection may not be total. Compulsory 
purchase in the Yangzi Delta was abandoned in 1985 and 1986 with the adoption of 
contract due to a glut in state grain and cotton. As the glut disappeared, 
compulsory sales returned with shortages in 1987-88 though it is still regarded as 
contracts, see Huang P. C. C. ( 1990) op.cit. 
2.This is signified in "Document So. 1 1995", released on l January 1985. Indeed, the 
nechanism in operation for resources acquisition and manipulation is the so-called 
"double-track system". The dual syitem governed that some purchases prices and 
even sale, distribution of agricultural commodities would be detersaned by market 
forces while some still guided by the state on contractual basis. Therefore, it |B 
noted that the various constructs (state stipulation, negotiation and regulation, 
contract) mentioned in the te*t is only a simplicity and typification in order to 
have .i l u c i d abstraction to facilitate the discussion of t o ve r nme n t - pe a s a nt in the 
<• n .'• ii i n £ r. e c 1 i o n a . 
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si tuations.* 
Endowed with the above indicators in portraying the relative 
strengths of government, middleman and peasant, we can construct 
concretely what we mean by strong government, weak government, strong 
middleman, weak middleman, strong peasant and weak peasant. 
Theoretically, there are eight different combinations of government, 
middleman and peasant relationship as depicted in the following diagram. 
1. Possible revision of agricultural policies may entirely constrict the scope of peasant 
autonomy specified by state stipulation, negotiation and refutation, and 
contracts. The monopolized purchase of some previously released agricultural 
commodities was revived in 1989. What the state control over agricultural 
commodities in market situations refers to, is the kind- of government-peasant 
relationship in that context, regardless of the possible alteration of this 
situation. 
2. Middleman, by locating in different kinds of organisation, enjoying varied sorts of 
payroll structure and possessing different types of resource! acquisition and 
manipulation means, may act as an agent of the state (furthering state interests) 
or a local leader (seeking for self and/or local interests). On that account, the 
nddleman per se nay concurrently play a significant role in shaping government-
peasant relationship. Therefore, to take the empirical world into consideration, 
wddlewn are treated here as both the meso-fabric mediating between government 
and peasant, and an actor in determining go ve r nap nt - peasant relationship. In fact, 
the characteristic of traditional Chinese locality is commonly denoted as a 
setting in which bureaucrats, (agents of the imperial state), gentry, (agents of 
local j nd self interests), and peasants interact with one another, a constituting 
feature of Chinese village. 
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Fig. 3 Permutation of government-peasant relationship 
Government* Middleman Peasant 
Strong Strong Strong 
Strong Strong Weak 
Strong Weak Strong 
Strong Weak Weak 
Weak Strong Strong 
Weak Strong Weak 
Weak Weak
 Strong 
Weak Weak Weak 
Orthodoxical analysis on state-society relationship builds on the 
premise that the state-society relationship is a zero-sum game. It 
maintains that a strong and penetrable state is incompatible with a 
strong civil society which embraces a significant number of voluntary 
associations, which in turn are capable of making decisions immune from 
the state's arbitrary interference. As a corollary, a strong society is 
often argued to be associated with a weak and fragmented state By the 
same token, every portion of society is deemed to be repressed by a 
omnipotent and omnipresent state. 
In the subsequent analysis and the above diagram, the rationale of 
the theoretical construct is based on the supposition that the axial 
dynamic development of state and society can be independent of each 
other though there may be a certain quantum of interaction between them. 
Put in another way, a monolithic view of zero-sum game? between state and 
Government' refer, ' ° I oc a, So ve r nme nt he r e, , „ 3 u b s e qilp n l d , S C U S 5 ( o n ^ 
analysis, rather than to central government. 
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society* is too simple to explain the reality. Some seemingly 
paradoxical combinations, such as mutual growth or mutual decay as 
constructed in the previous diagram are equally convincing. To have a 
more elaborate description of the eight types of integrated 
configuration among the government, middleman and peasant, the defining 
features^ of a strong government and strong middleman^  etc has to be 
expanded on. 
1.This line of analysis which adopts a comparative-historical approach with reference to 
the China context has been raised by Shue, V. ( 1989) op.cit. Bowever, this argument 
has not been subject to vigorous empirical substantiation. A comparative framework 
in regard to this argument has been applied to several countries, such as Chile, 
Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. The analysis can be seen in Stepan A." State Power 
and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America" in Evans 
p. B. , Rueschemeyer D. , Skocpol T. (ed. ) Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). Also, for the concepts of state capacity and 
autonomy, see Skocpol T. "Bringing the state back in: strategies of analysis in 
current research" in Evans, P. B. et al , ibid ( 1985). For the concern on a separate 
analysis of state and bureaucrat power as two actors instead of a combined one, 
see Heper, M. "The State and Public Bureaucracies: a comparative and historical 
perspective" I Kraus, R. , Vanneman, R. D. "Bureaucrats versus the State in 
Capitalist and Socialist Regimes" Comparative Studies in Society and History vol. 
27 1995. Also, a more detailed analysis on the types of state autonomy which takes 
such separation into account, can be found in Nordlinger, E. A. On the Autonomy of 
t he Denyycrnti c State Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
2.The elaboration of defining features as follows appear to be cumbersome but this 
demarcation has taken into account the possibility that there can be 
simultaneously strong government and strong peasant together. In this case, one 
has to realise that strong state and weak society would neither be the necessary 
companion nor strong state tantamount to weak society. 
1. There is the possibility that the notion of 'strong' and 'weak' would not be sufficient 
to arrest the all-out dynamics but only to provide the beginning gutdepost for 
delineating respective basic features of government, mi ddl etun and peasant. Since 
the actual meaninj of some paradoxical combinations as strong government and 
strong peasant, we a k government and v.» a k peasant may connote some additional 
meaning (to t>«- «5ealt with later) rather than that denoted prima facie. 
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Defining Features of Strong Government 
-predominant governmental structures 
-remuneration to cadres mainly based on state payroll 
-resources alloted and distributed basically on state stipulation 
Defining Features of Weak Government 
-dismemberment of governmental structures 
-inadequate remuneration to state-payroll cadres 
-ineffectively coordinated and implemented state stipulation 
Defining Features of Strong Middleman 
-occupying positions in several organisations 
-independent source of revenue 
-resources acquisition and manipulation basically dependent on 
negotiation and regulation 
Defining Features of Weak Middleman 
-occupying positions in several organisations 
-source of income determined both by government and locality 
-resources acquisition and manipulation fundamentally reliant either on 
state stipulation or contract 
Defining Features of Strong Peasant 
-predominant social organisations 
-revenue source essentially based on locality 
-contract as the integral mechanism in allocating resources 
Defining Features of Weak Peasant 
-paucity of social organisations 
-revenue sources primarily based on locality but insufficient and 
fluctuate 
-contract weak in coordinating resources distribution 
The meso fabric mediating government and peasant, theoretical 
possibilities of disparate combination of government and peasant, 
together with the defining features of respective strengths of 
government, middleman and peasant, help grapple with the core of 
research problem, that is, the formulation of three typical situations 
depicting government-peasant relationship*-. Three typical situations are 
identified, namely, coercive ritualism, disintegrated automony and 
2 
reactionary subsistence. 
In coercive ritualism, the defining features of peasant are their 
weakness, whose life is greatly constrained by the government and 
middleman. For instance, what to produce, at what price the government 
will purchase from peasants, would be out of the peasants' control. The 
local cadres, as the agents of state, find themselves opportunity to 
further their own interests at the expense of that of the peasants. 
Market is impotent in asserting the interests and autonomy of peasants 
against that of the government and middleman. Instead, the monopolized 
1. Thi o relationship is mainly constructed on the basis of the nature of to ve r nme nt - pe as ant 
relationship, but not on the consideration whether the peasant society is 
economically sprouting or declining, which is the essential yardstick of neo-
i net i t ut i onal i sm. 
2. It has lo be admitted that these three ideal situations is society-centred in outlook 
but the following discussions would bring forward its interaction with the 
Cover niwnl whenever pos«ibl«». 
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unified purchase and sale over peasants' produce would be exemplary. No 
doubt governmental control may develop in a great extent vis-a-vis 
peasant but such control would not bear any implications on the 
governmental capacity in reforming the peasant society. Nor is it 
capable of imposing or creating a kind of social rest for the peasant. 
The form of government action is not so much a general matter of 
construction as usurpation. This can be represented diagrammatically as 
follows: 
Fig. 4 Coercive Ritualism 
Strong government \ 
weak peasant 
Strong middleman and weak government / 
The premise of disintegrated automony attempts to depict a 
situation whereby not only rural governmental structures are incapable 
of implementing policies. The dismantlement of governmental structures 
renders an ineffective institution of policies. Meanwhile, though the 
peasants are free of governmental interference or instrusion of whatever 
kind, prosperity does not necessarily follow. Indeed, the peasants are 
fraught with predicaments that would have otherwise been controlled, 
contained or even managed by governmental interference. Leaving a free 
hand of rural management and development to the peasants means not rural 
order but chaos. Among peasants there are conflicts .and disorders. It is 
beyond the local cadres' ability to act as an independent local leader. 
None of the three actors can dominate over one another such that each of 
them is highly autonomous from the others, resulting in a purulyzed 
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stalemate.* A shorthanded representation would be like this: 
Fig. 5 Disintegrated weak government 
Autonomy / \ 
/ \ 
weak middleman weak peasant 
There are two variants within the perimeter of reactionary 
subsistence. This kind of peasant society may, in some cases, imply that 
not only can the peasants have unrestrained access to resources, such as 
inputs of production, access to market - both labour and product market, 
but also institute their own networks of association cooperation to 
guarantee their access. The close cooperations enable them to be quite 
independent of governmental intended control over certain essential 
means of production. However, reactionary subsistence may also happen in 
the context where a sprouting peasant economy may not be a necessary 
condition. 
The first variant of reactionary subsistence alludes to the 
marginal struggle among government, middleman and peasants, in whatever 
form of collusion or alliances, commonly visible in nature. Implicit 
resistance may take the form of misreporting grain harvest by peasants 
as a response to an unrealistically high production quota. The launching 
of special work team by the government to oversee the peasant routine 
l.The concern for the prem ses of action and order Is inspired by Alexander, J. c. Act I oq 
and I t a r
oa>w?nt :
 toward a ntv synthesis New York: Columbia University Press, 
19SS, especially chapter 1, Soci al - s t r uc t ur at analysis: Presuppositions, 
ideologies, empirical debatos L chaptor 10, Action and its environments. 
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harvest would be a kind of device to counteract peasants' tacit 
strategy. Such strategic response designed by each other would possibly 
result in certain conflictual situations. A tense cadre-peasant 
relationship currently discerned in some provinces characterises the 
situations. Grievances among peasants would be subsequently aroused by 
the rural cadres' abuse of power. The basis of bargaining power for the 
peasants and middleman may rely either on their escalating economic 
profile or social networks or both. 
The second variant sketches the encroachment of peasant economy 
towards the rural government, usually invisible and less violent in 
nature, to the extent that the government structures have been absorbed, 
incorporated and even restructured by the parameters of peasant economy. 
This peasant absorption of rural administrative apparatus may take place 
under the combined efforts of peasants and middleman. Local consent have 
to be secured before the appointment of local cadres. State agents have 
to consider granting concessions, administrative or economic in nature, 
to both peasants and middleman in regard to the practical concern of the 
viability of rural administration. Unavoidably, rural governmental 
structure would be easily converted into an arena where the peasant 
economy can claim its stake. In addition, the establishment of rural 
government and internal conflicts among those state agents may only 
mirror conflictual boundary of peasant economy, in some respects, along 
the lines of different lineages.
1
 Even so, the restructuring of rural 
administrative machinery would assume the form of debilitating 
l.It may wel I be po«n bl » that local cadres would only be the spokesnwn of different 
sectors of rural interests. 
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governmental machinery reflected in the withdrawal of local cadres, who 
are likely to become peasant entrepreneur (professional or specialised 
household). This is a manifestation of economic absorption of rural 
local administration. Both the middleman and peasant, by possessing ever 
increasing economic positions, can adopt their own stance vis-a-vis the 
government which can function effectively in villages only with 





weak government and strong middleman / 
Fig. 6 Reactionary Subsistence 
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CHAPTER 2 TIME k SPACE DISTRIBUTION 
In this chapter, the boundary of the subject matter is demarcated 
(the details of methodology and the sources of material for empirical 
analysis will be discussed in the appendix). This is primarily based on 
the statistical data published by the Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (ZGTJNJ). 
For a more concrete description of coercive ritualism, disintegrated -
autonomy and reactionary subsistence, further elaborations would be 
along two palpable dimensions. A succinct mention on geographical and 
temporal distribution of these types will be delivered here.
1
 In the 
following chapters, the respective types of government-peasant 
relationship will be delved with various illustrations. 
The definition of agriculture in China is itself a glossary: 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, subsidiaries and fishery. In 
recent years, the discussions on agriculture are closely related with 
and extended to commerce and industries which are regarded sis the 
subsidiaries previously. In regard to the classification on the 
respective values of productivity generated in rural areas, a wider 
frame is adopted for the classification, see the following table for the 
breakdowns. 
1. Gi dde n a i A. I.h? , CgpgU.VMt i gfl ?f 39CI Oxford: Polity Press, 1983. Further elaborations 
on time-space di s t a nc i a t i o n as one of the features of modernity can be found in 
Gi ddens. A. The Consequences of Modernity Cambri dee: Polity Press, 1990. 
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Table. 1 Total Value of Productivity in Rural Villages (as at 1988) 
(in billion yuan) 
(extracted from ZGTJNJ 1989) 
Agricultural productivity value* 5865.27 
Agricultural industrial productivity value * 4781.16 
Agricultural construction productivity value 895.33 
Agricultural transport productivity value 4 3 4 . 4 4 
Agricultural commerce, food and beverage 
productivity value 558.49 
Table. 2 Total Value of Agricultural Productivity (ELS at 1988) 
(in billion yuan) 
(extracted from ZGTJNJ 1989) 
Agricultural produce productivity value 3276.88 
Agricultural forestry productivity value 275.30 
Agricultural animal husbandry productivity value 1597.57 
Agricultural subsidiaries productivity value 393.05 
Agricultural fishery productivity value 322.47 
The relative proportion of labour force engaging in the respective 
sectors is roughly proportional to that of the value of agricultural 
productivity, so it would not be repeated here. The reason for 
indicating the productivity value of the respective sectors is to deduce 
l.This agricultural productivity value equal « to the summation of the forthcoming 
agricultural produce productivity value, agricultural forestry productivity value, 
agricultural animal husbandry productivity value, agricultural subsidiaries 
productivity value and agricultural fishery productivity value. 
30 
the relative significance of each sector. Their relative significance is 
used as the yardstick to select the appropriate sectors to illustrate 
the government-peasant relationship. 
The agricultural productivity value (5865.27 billion yuans) and 
the agricultural industrial value (4781.16 billion yuans) occupy a 
significant proportion of the total value of productivity in rural 
villages, and thus would be subjects of my analysis. For the total value 
of agricultural productivity per se, evidently, the agricultural produce 
productivity value (3276.88 billion yuans) and the agricultural animal 
husbandry productivity value (1597.57 billion yuans) are identified as 
significant sectors for illustrating the implications of government-
peasant relationship. In cases selected particular attention would be 
paid to these sectors. 
The geographical distribution of the three types of relationship 
is of two levels. In the macro-level, analysis will be done on 
provincial distribution (provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities), 
inland-coastal dichotomy, rich-poor dichotomy. The micro-level analysis 
includes: hilly inland-navigable river dichotomy and the prevalence of 
rural enterprises
1
. The tremendous spatial diversity of rural China 
precludes a comprehensive demonstration of a distribution of different 
types of gove rnmen t - p e a s an t relationship by the handful of dichotomies 
I.The recognition of na cro-l evel distribution would further complicate the distribution 
based mainly on macro-level di ot rl buti on, but it is studied BO that hopefully the 
diversified distribution of the three types can be discerned more realistically. 
(The effect of nacro-level distribution would be similar to that of intervening 
variables.) The actual diversified distribution tat ght only be partially 
represented here even wi t h the inclusion of the micro-level distribution. The 
dichotomy presented here is neither strictly adhered to nor a totally mutually 
exel ust ve one. 
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listed above.* But still, the dichotomies prove to be useful as 
indicators of the general trend of the geographical distribution. 
Macro Spatial Distribution 
Self-autonomous regions, as opposed to the common provinces and 
municipalities, are more likely to be characterised with the 
disintegrated autonomy
2
 since these regions intrinsically suggest the 
existence of state authorities that are intentionally self-restricted in 
nature, in order to allow for certain level of autonomy for the 
minorities. This would, at its best efforts, be maintained unless the 
minorities rebel against state orders. Bascially, the pre-existing state 
institutional structure has encouraged the emergence of the 
disintegrated autonomy. By and large, both the Ningxia Huizu Zizhiqu and 
Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu can be regarded as sharing this type of 
3 
government peasant relaionship. 
In the coastal provinces, which are usually richer ones, either 
coercive ritualism or reactionary subsistence prevails. Examples are the 
l.In addition, the limited amount of empirical cases collected from the periodicals 
published in China has foreclosed such possibility. The discussions of the 
pervasiveness and limitations of this collection of cases would be dealt with in 
t he appendi x. 
2. For this study, the spatial parameters only serve as structural indicators on the 
distribution. Neither a sufficient nor a determining relationship is implied in 
t he di scussi ons. 
3. See -Village and economic, development in the poor region" 1986 no. 5, "The ecooonc 
thought of poverty" 1999 no.l, "Ningxia national minority cadre" 1988 no. 3, 
"Discussions on the villages in national minority region" 1989 no. 3, "Survey and 





 "Making good for the market and sale 
cooperatives i n t he autonomous region" XULLLaJl She , l{uj K<? XU?. 1985 no. 2. 
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Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces. Relatively free economic 
transactive exchanges corrananding a country-wide market* in Guangdong is 
an example of reactionary subsistence. Counties in Zhejiang also 
demonstrate a rather autonomous economy relatively free from arbitrary 
cadre influence, as reflected in their quite independent sources of 
village income. These counties are Cangnan, Pingyang, Ruian, Cixi, 
Fuyang, Tonglu, Deqing, Xinchang, Yuyao, etc.
2
 Fujian is similar to 
o 
Zhejiang in this aspect. 
Interestingly, coercive ritualism is also found in the richer 
coastal areas. The county of Nanhai in Guangdong
4
, Wuxi in Jiangsu
5
 are 
typical examples. The reason may be that the macro spatial distribution 
is greatly diluted by some micro spatial parameters, as discussed below. 
The counties in the poorer provinces as Shaanxi, Gansu, Henan, 
Anhui and Guizhou (which is also hilly) are largely restricted by the 
state sector in the provision of the inputs of production. Further 
expansion of market outlet is under the auspices of cadre efforts. These 
areas are characterised by coercive ritualism. For instance, Longli, 
Zunyi, Guiding county in Guizhou, Lingtao, Dingxi in Gansu, Dingyuan in 
Anhui, Tangyin in Henan, Luochuan, Zhidan Wuqi in Shaanxi are 
illustrative examples. Although they are only a small portion of the 
1. "The agriculture in the Pearl Delta" Guangdong She nui Ke Xue 1987 no. 1. 
2."Insights of Wenzbou agricultural commodity market" Zhejiang Xue Kan 1988, no. I. 
3. Wee V. " A Theory of Market Transition" American Sociological Review 1990 vol.54 Oct. 
"Devel opment of new mode of township enterprises " Xue Shu Yan Ji u 1988 no. 4. 
5. ' Sync hroni za t i o n of three models" Jiang Hai Xue Kan 1998 no. 5. 
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counties in each of the province, their ramifications should not be 
underestimated. 
Micro Spatial Distribution 
Proximity to navigable river and the existence of burgeoning rural 
enterprises may considerably moderate the effect of macro spatial 
distribution. To cite one case, some counties in the province of Anhui, 
situating at lower Yangtze and thus rich in raw materials with wide 
markets, are endowed with certain autonomy. Specifically, Lujiang, 
Wuwei, Hexian in Anhui are examples of reactionary subsistence, rather 
than coercive ritualism. 
On the contrary, the micro context of rural enterprises entitles 
the cadres as well as the state to appropriate the earnings of peasants 
working in the enterprises.
1
 The province of Guangdong demonstrates the 
operation of collective remnants in redistributing the surplus earnings 
of peasants serving the rural enterprises. So is the case in Nanghai 
county. 
All in all, in order to have a more accurate description of the 
distribution of different types of government-peasant relationship, both 
the macro and micro context have to be considered. The overlapping of 
contradictory types of relationship is a product of the interplay of 
both the macro and micro level forces. 
I. Vofipl , I. Mn  .-rtPO ah* in Chi na Caabr. Ha r va r <1 Cm v* r B, t y Pr ea s. 19S9. 
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Temporal Distribution 
Temporal distribution is to be dealt together with changes in 
agricultural policy. Abrupt policy changes are found at several periods. 
The first obviously refers to the period immediately after the 
promulgation of the implementation of household responsibility system 
(1979-80). Peasants respond differently to the changes. In poorer 
regions, such as Hebei and Anhui, which received minimal help from the 
collective originally, the collectives faced with the severe challenge 
of being dismantled since the peasants were anxious to have a share of 
the collective property. This is apparently a case of disintegrative 
autonomy whereby the strength of collective control has dropped to the 
lowest. Cadres in the collective were not instructed with detailed 
commands to handle the peasants' response. In fact, cadres were 
uncertain of the extent of their authority, and thus what their proper 
role was. The result was an autarchic peasant society. 
Reactionary subsistence also surfaces in these periods. In 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Liaoning, a high level of collectivity has 
customarily been satisfying to the entertained peasants, since the pre-
existing collective structure succeeds in generating a relatively decent 
living standard. Uprooting of collectives served only to infringe, both 
their collective and personal interests. It is not uncommon for peasants 




l.Zwcifi D. "Opposition to Change in Rural China: the system of responsibility and people's 
commune" A,., an Survey vol . XXI I I no. 7 July 19S3. 
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After the explicit articulation of the dismantlement of commune 
and the replacment of township or village government in 1983, there was 
a call for the formal establishment of township enterprises which embody 
the characteristics of former communes or brigade enterprises. Voices 
are loud in the provinces of Anhui, Jiangsu. Numerous enterprises were 
formally established since then. Peasants already ploughing the field 
were given the option to work in collective enterprises for more secure 
income. Their share of income was under the collective management of 
township enterprises. 
Gradual loosening in the state control of prices over grain, wool, 
fuel in 1984 and 1985 onwards signified a round of alterations in the 
pattern of government-peasant relationship. Prior to the loosening of 
control, the state monopolised the purchases and sales of the produces 
and leakage to market was forbidden. Peasants who relied on these 
sources for their basic income were thus at the mercy of strict state 
stipulations. This is a relationship best represented by coercive 
ritualism. 
There have been a series of policy changes since 1985, which 
marked the beginning of permitted sales in market. Peasants could 
bargain for a better price in the negotiable sales to the state. Greater 
autonomy was enjoyed under this policy. 
1988 saw reversal of the policies. State control in the purchases 
of grain, wool and fuel was an effort to manage the problem of food 
shortages. A withdrawal of the autonomy granted in the peasants' dealing 
of these produces, coupled by the grain shortages, are important, hints 
36 
to the temporal distribution of the respective relationship types. 
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CHAPTER 3 COERCIVE RITUALISM 
Coercive ritualism seeks to describe and explain the circumscribed 
peasant sector under the control of rural government, under that of 
local cadres, or both. Clientelism unfolded as the local cadres 
established their own network of clients within.
1
 The range of control 
over peasants differed in the process of decollectivisation, the 
commencement of household responsibility system and the disorganisation 
of communes. Several aspects may illuminate varied measures of control 
but still the pattern of coercive ritualism is discernible. 
In this chapter, several conditions associated with coercive 
ritualism will be laid out, followed by a number of empirical cases. It 
is the aim of this chapter to elaborate on the intricate dynamics of 
coercive ritualism, which is distinct from a purely hypothetical 
totalitarian control on peasants. The dynamics is further complicated by 
various lossening conditions though essentially constrained by some 
fundamental impediments. 
Before embarking on the discussion of the various conditions 
associated with coercive ritualism per se, these conditions are to be 
< 
I. CI i entel i sm, specifically, has to. be differentiated from government control over 
peasants, which is one of the dimensions of government-peasant relationship. 
Clientelism precisely alludes to the particularistic relationship, patron-client 
relation, between two persons or two groups of people. This is difficult to be 
substantially demonstrated by merely describing the bases of privileges enjoyed by 
cadres in favour of certain peasants. Consequently, this can only be deduced but 
not vindicated in this instance. In fact, this is the major shortcoming in Oi • s 
work (1999). On the one hand, she disputes the existence of clientelism; on the 
other, she fails to display the networks and details of exchanges between peasants 
and cadres but only the benefits that can be distributed to the peasants. In 
effect, what is denoted by the more encompassing coercive ritualism can 
theoretically incorporate the existence of cl . e nt el i sm but not vice versa. 
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concisely examined first to facilitate an analysis in the two types of 
government-peasant relationship. The differences among these conditions 
and their relative importance are the yardstick which differentiates the 
three types of government-peasant relationship. These conditions are the 
nature of agricultural policies, the level of agricultural collectivity, 
the level of commercialisation and some specific local peculiarities. 
Since 1978, the main features of agricultural policies, are the 
extension of years of land leasing-
1
- , the boosting of state (imposed) 
purchase price over agricultural produce, and the lowering of 
agricultural taxes
2
. These agricultural policies moderated the tight 
control over the peasants. The perimeter previously imposed on the 
peasants was largely loosened. 
It would be necessary to look into the multi-faceted dimensions of 
1. Even under t be period of decol 1 ecti vi sati on, land ownership is assumed to be under the 
collective but the period of land lease is lengthened up to 15 years for rice 
fields. In such situation, though the land ownership is nominally under the 
collective, the actual utilization is fully under the discretion of peasants 
wi t hi n t hi s peri od. 
2.There were some exceptional reversals on this overall trend, which could be detected 
from the imposition of compulsory sales in the times of shortage (1987-88), making 
the contract between the government and peasants ' pseudo' in nature. 
3.A series of interviews by Unger yields results that the decision on the type of 
household contracting system adopted was made exclusively by officials at levels 
far above the village. This is based on reports from twenty-eight interviewees, 
twenty-four of which have pinpointed the above situation. However, this can only 
suggest one of the aspects of production decision being determined out of the 
reach of peasants and what have been actually implemented would be another matter. 
Cnger.J. "The Decol I ect i vi sat i on of the Chinese Countryside: A Survey of Twenty-
e.tfht Villages" Paci f i £ M. L 31 1£ 19S5-S6, no. i vol. 3%. 
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agricultural collectivity* to yield a meaningful understanding of 
government-peasant relationship. In this context, they are the 
concentration of land lease, the level of rural industrialisation and 
the existence of large development project, probably irrigation and 
water control project. 
First, the concentration of land lease on peasants. This has been 
substantially altered since the assignment of full responsibility to the 
household (dabaogan). Previously, the farm land is claimed to be 
collectively owned by the commune but now the common practice is to 
divide the land and farm machinery on team or household basis.
2
 There is 
a great variety of types of land lease, ranging from land occupation 
with the sole concern of reaping consideration when there is a policy 
reversal, lease of land on individual basis, lease of land by some 
l.The collectivity of agriculture is justified as an essential dimension in accounting for 
the government-peasant relationship. It has been one of the debatable topics in 
organising and coordinating agriculture. See Nolan P. The Political Economy of 
Collective Farms Boul der, Col o.: West vi ew Press, 1988. A comparative counterpart in 
the eigthteenth century France signifies the importance of using collective 
enforcement mechanism to collect taxes. "The preservation of communal institutions 
like conlidaire served to strengthen the crown's control over the rural areas. 
Collective controls were necessary because the king could not afford the costs of 
directly supervising individual peasants..." see, Root H. L. "State Power and the 
Persistence of Communal Institutions i n 01 d Regime France" Pol i ti cs 1 Soci et V 15, 
no.3 ( 1986-87). 
2.Six broad forms of production responsibility system can be identified: 1) speci al i zed 
contracting with remuneration linked to output (zhuanye chengbao, 1 i anchan 
jichou); 2)contracti ng production for wor k-groups with remuneration linked to 
output (lianchan daozu); 3)linking remuneration to output of each labourer, under 
unified leadership (tongyi 1 i ngdao, lianchan daolao); 4)fixing output quotas for 
each household (baochan daohu); 5)assigning full responsibility to the household 
(baogan daohu or daogan); 6)short team contracts for field work (xlaoduan 
baogong). Not all of these derive implications on the level of land concentration. 
Out of these six forms, the assignment of full responsibility to the households, 
the most common practice being adopted, permits the lowest level of land 
concentration. This al I ows for the household to utilize the land for i t r. own use. 
(This does not take the subsequent land aggregation by the specialized households 
into account.) Johnson G. E. "The Production Responsibility System in Chinese 
Agriculture: Sow examples from Guangdong" Paci fir ,\f (ai rs vol.53 no. 3 fall 19S2. 
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specialised households for crop specialisation, to lease of land by-
concurrent job household (jianye hu). In short, land is no longer the 
integral basis on which the local cadre or rural government can exercise 
control over peasants*-. 
Second, the level of rural industrialisation (specifically 
referring to township and village-owned enterprises). The blossoming of 
rural enterprises on the one hand has generates tremendous economic 
impact on by the townships and villages . On the other, the setting of 
rural enterprises, reflecting the level of rural industrialisation, 
creates an environment of collectivity that is comparable to that of the 
previous commune. It is contended that the higher the level of rural 
industrialisation, the more likely that local government will act in a 
corporate manner to intervene, extract and redistribute income of 
peasants
3
. The following diagram illustrates the increasing importance 
1. Tradi ti onal 1 y, Chinese peasants were fundamentally reliant on land for their existence, 
so the control over land tenure and levy (whether in kind or in agricultural tax) 
by landlord or gentry would indirectly bespeak of control over peasant lives. (It 
is no exception in other third world countries, see l«fi gdal , J. s. "Capitalist 
Penetration in the Nineteenth Century : Creating Conditions for New Patterns of 
Social Control" in Weller.R. P. «< Guggenhei m, S. E. (ed.)Power and Protest in the 
count rvsi de Durham: Duke University Press, 1982. ) in the Communist China, the 
similar control over land tenure and levy together with household registration 
system established in the commune - a rigid demarcation of rural and urban 
population generating the effect of geographical fixation of peasants in 
countryside - provides an effective immobility and control mechani sra on peasants. 
2. At its early inception, the emergence of rural enterprises stimulate hopes of rescuing 
rural bankrupcy but their substantial economic contributions vary. The Government 
has spent about 40 mi 1 I i an yuan to help revive bankrupt enterprises in 1988. Chi na 
j^ ws Ana| ySj s March 1 1989. However, this is not the main focus of this paper. 
3. See Oi , J. "The Fate of the Collective after the Commune" in Davi G, D. I Vogel E. F. (ed.) 
Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen: The Impact of Reform (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 1990). oi attempts to educe the previ ouol y wel 1 -ar t i cul a t e d 
clientelism in the context of rural industrialisation, the coi nace being 
collective corporatism. 
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of rural industrialisation, which demonstrates the increasing relative 
proportion of n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l production in total rural income. 
Table.3 Nonagricultural Production as % of Total Rural Income, 1983-87 
Year Industry Construction Transport Commerce & Catering 
1983 20.0 7.8 2.0 3.5 
1984 23.1 7.4 2.6 3.7 
1985 27.6 8.1 3.0 4.2 
1986 31.5 7.8 3.3 4.3 
1987 34.8 7.7 3.5 4.4 
Source: ZGTJNJ 1988 
Third, existence of large development project necessitating 
collective decision making.
1
 Development projects, such as irrigation 
projects and joint-ventures always nourish some kind of need for 
integrating various decollectivised units to act as a collective entity. 
The bargain between these entities with outsiders would easily allure 
governmental intrusion to act on their own behalf and in whatever form 
of interference it sees fit. 
Apart from the nature of agricultural policies, the level of 
agricultural collectivity, the level of commercialisation - the 
emergence of urban market and improvement of transport network - does 
also count in the conditions associated with the three types of 
l.A hydraulic society is disputed to be structurally conducive to a strong and total 
state. See, Wittfogel K. A. Oriental Despotism: a comparative study of total power 
Sew York: Vintage Books, 1957. 
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government-peasant relationship. The emergence of market town 
(xiaochengzhen or jizhen) accompanied with an urban market, a recent 
topic attracting numerous debates in the mainland, leads to an 
overlapping of networks of communication among various resources. Nodal 
points are able to serve the provision of auxiliary services, market 
outlets for agricultural product/produce.
1
 Improvement in the transport 
network would inflate business exchanges while reinforcing the overall 
impact of commercialisation. Last but not least is local peculiarities 
which would be dealt with specifically in the repective types of 
government-peasant relationship. 
Nature of Agriculture Policies 
Despite the general trend of releasing the monopolised purchase 
and sale of raw materials and essential agricultural products, the 
abrupt change in the year of 1988 has somewhat reversed the trend. To 
contain the competition for the raw materials and to combat against the 
so-called price war, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and 
Fishery has stipulated certain materials to be allocated under their 
directives.
2
 The rural enterprises in Anhui immediately suffer from the 
extension of control over raw materials. 
1. Further details are available in the study of market town. In the past, market towns 
served as the bastion of the administrative and party machinery and performed as a 
point to collect grains, oil, cotton, pigs for the state, probably similar to the 
extension of market and sale cooperatives. Present market towns are mainly found 
in the secondary and tertiary sectors and are capable of providing labour forces, 
funds, etc. See "The functions of market -town and agricultural modernization" 
ol ogi <r*| Studies 1987, no. 2. 
2. These include rice, silkworm, cotton, wool, cowhide, timber, musk liquorice, steel and 
coal also fall into this category. See "Dilemmas i outlets" Ji ang Huai Lun Tan 
19SD no.2. 
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Level of Agricultural Collectivity 
The dispute going with decollectivisation is that remnants of the 
collective still retain control over some processes of agricultural 
production including crop planning, ploughing and planting, irrigation, 
machine use, pest control and basic land construction
1
. Cadres still 
maintain partially monopolised control over sources of income after 
decollectivisation as in the provision of agricultural inputs, market 
o 
and sales opportunities, and salaried job opportunities. The newly-
formed village government, replacing the production team as the lowest 
level of administration, constitutes another form of collectivity from 
which the peasants have to seek help. In regard to the agricultural 
inputs, cadres can maintain control over distribution of rationed and 
low-priced inputs, chemical fertilizer and motor fuel; access to scarce 
non-rationed inputs (farm equipment), draft animals and tractors; and 
allocation of collective resources for contract (chengbao), land, 
factories and equipment. For the market and sales opportunities, these 
embrace permission to grow certain types of crop; access to market 
information and technical expertise; and access to sales contracts 
(state, collective and private). Recommendations and authorizations for 
salaried job opportunities, (state factories and collective enterprises 
l.In practice, these activities may be directly organized by the collective, by the 
specialized households who contract with the collective, by obligatory labour from 
households as part of the contract, or by the households and coordinated with the 
collective. See Watson, A."New Structures in the Organisation of Chinese 
Agriculture: a variable model" Paci f i c Af f ai rs 1984-85, vol.57 no. 4 
2.oi J.C. state an't Peasant »n Contemporary China: The Pol i t i cal Economy of vt I I at? 
Government Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 
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in urban and rural areas) must be made with the permission from 
cadres.
1
 In brief, the fact that the village government performs as 
landlords, franchising company, employment agency and allocator of 
inputs all at once vindicates the peasants' dependence on the state 
redistributive sector. This is supplemented by a partial market, though 
o 
the sources of control are diversified in nature.
a 
The fate of collectives is contended not to be linked with the 
structural reforms, (that is, the structural dismantlement of collective 
in favour of village government,) but with the sources of income in a 
village. The rise of rural enterprises with industrialisation functions 
as another kind of corporate collective that distributes and squeezes 
the income of peasants.
 3
 To clarify its definition, "rural enterprises" 
include various types of ventures, from factories to food stalls, 
collective or privately owned; but most of the large industrial concerns 
are owned by the collective (regarded as township enterprises, xiangzhen 
qiye) and not individuals.
4
 Direct and indirect subsidies would be 
extracted from township enterprises for the construction of villages. 
l.The geographical coverage of the research by Oi J. can be indicated by the origins of 
those interviewees, who comes from Harbin, Ji 1 i n, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, 
Shanghai, Fuzhou, Guanglhou and Kunming. Oi J.( 1989) op.cit. 
2.0i J.C. "Market Reforms and Corruption in Rural China" Studies in Comparative Communism 
vol.XXII no.2/3 suromer/autumn, 1989. 
3.It is further postulated that villages which rely primarily on agriculture are most 
likely to experience the decline of collective, both in fiscal and organisational 
terrau. Oi , J. "The fate of collective after the commune" in Davis D. Vogel E. F. 
( ed. ) 1990, op. ci t. 
4. The number of these collectively owned enterprises, estimated at 1.5 million, counts on 
a small portion of the total number of rural enterprises. However, their 
importance can be illustrated by the amount of income they generate. Xiangzhen 
qiye contributed 32.3% i 34.9% to the total agricultural income in 1985 and 1986 
respectively. ZCTJNJ. 1988. 
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Highly industrialised and wealthy villages built schools, apartments, 
and provided free water and electricity.
1
 Another policy called "using 
industry to subsidize agriculture" authorizes local government to take 
o 
profits from the township enterprises" to assist agriculture. The 
compulsory 'loans' were imposed on those who were employed in industry.^  
This income source, together with some other, would be pooled together 
for redistribution under the allocation of rural enterprises, like a 
corporation. Reforms have decentralized agriculture but not industry* 
Rural enterprises have been realized as a corporate entity to collect 
and redistribute income for the alleged benefits of the village under 
the directives of the village government. 
It would be noteworthy to inspect the nature and origins of the 
policy - using industry to subsidize agriculture. It seems that the 
emergence of rural enterprises, under the trend of industrialisation in 
rural villages, has recently created and structured the government-
peasant relationship. As a result, the peasants in enterprises were 
positioned in the collectivity to be readily exploited by the village 
government. It is propounded here that the policy of using industry to 
l.A village provides subsidies for education, in one instance, up to 3, 000 yuan, in 
another, 6,000 yuan. A village near Shenyang provides 60 yuan per student, 60 yuan 
nursery school fee per toddler, 3 yuan per person for health insurance, and 20 
yuan per month in old-age pensions for men over 60 and women over 55 years old. 
550 jin of rice being would be provided free by the village to each member as the 
basic grain ration. 0i J. ( 1990) op.cit. 
2.In 1981, commune enterprises were required to contribute 30X of their profits to finance 
agri cul ture. oi J. ( 1990) i bi d. 
3. For instance, in parts of Sichuan, peasants who wanted to work in village enterprises 
paid 500 to 1,000 yuan to the factory. Some find that in Wuxi , workers were 
required to bring in with them 2, 000 to 3,000 yuan. Oi , J. ( 1990) ibid. 
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subsidize agriculture is simply to ratify the already existing commune 
contributions to collective agriculture.
1
 Before the onset of the 
household responsibility system, communes could directly utilize 
revenues from industry sideline to purchase chemical fertilizer, 
pesticide, motor fuel, electricity and to construct irrigation works 
under the camouflage of communes. Therefore, such diversion of funds 
from industry to agriculture were not easily detected.
2 
The contributions of industry to agriculture are crystal clear in 
the implementation of household responsibility system and the consequent 
independent accounting of fiscal situations of enterprises and 
agriculture. In the county of Muping, it has been stipulated that 
differentials between the sale and purchase price of inputs of 
agriculture production brought by the brigade or team would be 
underwritten by the rural enterprises. Inputs of agricultural production 
collectively purchased by the brigade or team would be stated to be sold 
at a suppressed price to the peasants. It was compulsory for the workers 
employed in the industrial sideline to work for agricultural irrigation 
l.The illustrations are extracted from the county of Muping of Shandong. See "Survey and 
preliminary analysis on the shifts of land contracting" in Agriculture. Economy 
and Society vol. 3 1985. 
2.In most unified collectives, there is a strong collective control over accumulation and 
distribution of income as a whole. This practice is not solely restricted to rural 
enterprises. Richer collectives, in general, deriving over 50\ of total income 
come from subsidiaries, may use a variety of devices to transfer income from the 
non-agri cul t ural to the agri cul t ur a| sector and to balance income among peasants 
working in different undertakings. See, Watson, A. "New Structures in the 
Organisation of Chinese Agriculture: a variable model" Paci f i c Af f ai r s 1984-S5, 
vol.57, no.4. 
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works without remuneration.^  In harvest time, the workers in enterprises 
were obliged to participate in the transportation and sowing work. 
Therefore, enterprise workers as individuals and rural enterprise as a 
collectivity are exposed to the appropriation and distribution of 
o 
village government. Rural industrialisation has meaningfully solidified 
the implementation of the policy - using industry to subsidize 
agriculture. 
At the early inception of household responsibility system before 
the disorganisation of commune, the communes are encouraged to establish 
their own enterprises (the predecessor of rural enterprises). The 
management of commune enterprises was joint-ventures of the party and 
enterprises. Cadres, in holding privileged positions in enterprises, are 
prone to abuse their power by expanding their own expenditure limit.^ 
The appropriation and distribution of surplus in the commune enterprises 
would be in favour of the collectives of commune and production brigade 
1.The method of calculation is as follows: to estimate the availability of fund from the 
enterprise and the amount of enterprise labour. Under unified supervision of the 
collective, enterprise labour were directed to the works associated with 
agriculture. See, "Survey and prel i mi nary analysis on the shifts in land 
contracting", Agriculture, Economy i. Society vol.3 1985. 
2.The state extraction of peasants may be disguised in the name of appropriation. Actual 
extraction may be executed in the name of state but in the interests of cadres. 
Appropriation for rural construction remains a popular and effective excuse. See, 
"Reforming village cadre system i s the essential content to deepen village reform" 
i n Sociology & Social Research 1990, no. l. 
3. See "Discussions on the functions of commune enterprises and industrial, commerce 
cooperative enterprises" Ji ang Hai Xue Kan 1982 no.2. 
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rather than the individuals
1
, who were entangled in a context similar to 
that of communes.
2
 The establishment of these enterprises, an extension 
of communes as well as on the set-up of commune would be institutionally-
conducive to the interference by cadres or government. However, the 
development of commune enterprises into agricultural, industrial and 
commercial cooperative enterprises would not immune them from arbitrary 
influence and extraction. The reason is that the purchases, transport 
and sales run by the market and sale cooperative and nationalised 
cooperative is not less than an actual blockage imposed on the 
enterprises, though indirectly. 
Arbitrary cadre interference is common inside the rural 
enterprises. In Jiangsu, the influence of village cadres is ubiquitious, 
even though the enterprises are already under specialized contracting 
(chengbao). The substitution of administrative directives for economic 
decisions in rural enterprises by village cadres takes the form of 
time-specific, time-concentrated and indirect influence instead of the 
former mass scale, daily and routine interference. The ritualistic 
response of contractors is realised in their short term behaviour 
without due regard to capital accumulation, investment and long term 
1. Despi te the various constraints imposed on the peasants( the implication is not that 
they are unwilling to work under the collectives. Given the fact that levels of 
collective income and benefits are higher than those that can be generated through 
private family sidelines or private business, peasants have little incentive to 
work outside just to raise few chickens and pigs. See Watson, A. "New Structures 
in the Organisation of Chinese Agriculture: a variable model" Paci f i c Af f ai rs 
1984-85 vol . 57 no. 4. 
2. See, "Discussions on the functions of commune enterprises and agricultural, industrial 




 Private enterprises are not exempted from haphazard cadre 
influence. Systematic extraction like taxation (usually aggregating a 
large amount
2
) and accidental interference perturbs the private 
enterprises. Deployment of resources is to the cadres' own benefit. Even 
worser is their involvement in economic crime and violation of party 
discipline.^ The location of enterprises in highly commercialised 
regions does not detract the power and influence of cadres in any 
considerable extent,
4
 as researches in wealthy regions report. To boost 
the rural economy, the urban state factories, the commercial departments 
and the party committee of the county are entitled to impose elaborate 
bureaucratic control on the countryside, besides on the specific rural 
1.This reflects the general situation in Jiangsu since the model of Wuxi rural enterprise 
was advocated by the provincial level to be applied at the county level. 
"Synchronization of three models" Ji ang Hai Xue Kan 1988 no. 5. 
2. The description is based on situations in the counties of Cangnan, Pi ngyang, Rui an, 
Wenling, Ci xi , Fuyang, Tongl u, Deqi ng, Xi nchang, Yuyao, Longquan, Li nan, Yuhang, 
Xi aoshan and Ji ande in the province of Zhejiang. It is reported that private 
enterprises in those counties surrounding Wenzhou Shi have to pay 100, 000 yuan 
each for tax. Some may reach 160, 000 yuan. See "The development of Zhejiang 
village private enterprises" Zhejj ang Xue Kan 1988 no. 3. The collectivity 
influence (facilitating cadre interference) induced by industrialisation 
(flourishing of private enterprises) can yield such an immense impact felt at the 
micro level that overwhelms the macro impact that the region is being rich (rich 
region would, in general, experience less cadre influence given wel 1-de vel oped 
transport and market networks). 
3. In the past, the cadres would make use of their positions to acquire benefits in favour 
of their relatives, like going backdoor. At present, they transform their 
positional power to direct monetary gains, in some cases, committing illegal acts 
in the economic realm. Administrative control would be metamorphosed to illegal 
extraction of monetary gains. See, "Analysis of the illegal acts by party cadres" 
Ti angxi She »ui Ke Xue 1986 no. 5. 
4.An illustration in the county of Nanhai in Guangdong suggests that the village head can 
exercise limited functions as no village enterprise exists in Honglong (village), 
; t iS at the xi ang level that cadres have been active in creating collective 
enterprises. See, Thireau.I. "Recent Changes in a Guangdong Village" Austral i an 




Although the transformation of villages to township was 
institutionalized, few material alterations are introduced into the 
whole collectivity. The township government is far from a hierarchical 
structure but rather a collectivity susceptible to haphazard influence 
from a handful of cadres. The transformation of a village into a 
township government, a supposed impossibility, indicates the 
irremovability of local rural cadres, which assumed dominance even in 
o 
the township level. 
The constraints inflicted on the peasants are equally significant. 
Restrictions imposed on the peasants are not necessarily stipulated 
explicitly in documents but they were seen in almost every situations. 
The control was arbitrary, and very often even ambiguous. For instance, 
the granting of loan was still exercised on team basis at the early 
years of the responsibility system. Rural cadres, confronted with a bulk 
of new decision-marking responsibility, had to seek instructions from 
several levels above. Consequently, decision-making on rural villages 
1. See Si u H. Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1989, Chapter 11 The Paradox of Self-reliance. Vogel 
E. F. One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under reform London: Harvard Dniversity 
Press, 1989, Chapter 3 A Decade of Reforms. 
2. This is found in the area of Longli county of Gui zhou. See "A preliminary study on the 
market town in the county of Longl i " Gui zhou She Hui Ke Xue 1986 no. 10. 
3. For instance, in what circumstances the loans can be granted out, whether the loans can 
be granted to those marketing illegal goods, how to resolve the conflicts when the 
terms of loans different from those listed out by local party cadres, what the 
respective clients of credit cooperative and bank are, etc. See "The target client 
of granting loan should be individual households" Gui zhou She Hui Ke Xue 19S1 
no. 2. 
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would be time-consuming and restrained especially in regard to those 
relevant to peasants. 
Level of Commercialisation 
The most visible fund application of the rural enterprises is the 
compulsory appropriation of enterprise surplus to the rural government.^  
Cadre interference in rural enterprises is attributable to the 
impossibility of fixing a realisable contract quota otherwise 
practicable in a market economy. The market fails to provide essential 
information, such as fluctuations in product prices during the contract 
team, prices.of raw materials, fuels and market outlets for the final 
product.^  Therefore, even rural enterprises in the most wealthy and most 
accessible region may be subject to various hindrances from the cadres 
who assume the responsibility for export trade (Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade). It is lamented that the rural enterprises 
in Guangdong, generating the highest export earnings in average, has to 
export the products with the permission and registration from the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. Paradoxically, 
1.The portion of surplus to 'be paid to the district, county and village by rural 
enterprises amount to a considerable sum. The rule is that rural enterprises have 
to pay at most 40% of their profits to the rural government but the actual 
proportion may amount to 50-60% in average. Apart from the large piece of profit 
to be paid to the rural government, some other regulations may further limit their 
exercise of autonomy. The short contract team for rural enterprises may preclude 
many long terra const ructi ve decisions for the enterprises. The quantity produced 
is the major criterion for determining the performance of the enterprises, at the 
expense of other qualitative consideration. The self-imposed limitations loomed 
large in township enterprises as cadres in the enterprises would take more factors 
into account, e.g. the possible shifts of existing policy, the political line of 
the township enterprises. See "The problems of agricultural collective 
enterprises" in fiu.mgdong she Hui Ke Xue 1987 no. 1. 
2. See "Synchronization of three models" Ji ang Hai Xue Kan 198S no. 5. 
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export-oriented rural enterprises are greatly impeded by the cadres.
1 
The development of urban market and market town accummulates 
benefits in economic transaction and therefore it is easier for 
agricultural by-products to access the nodal point for purchases and 
sales. The purchasing of farm machinery is done through the networks in 
market town. On the contrary, relatively undeveloped market town is 
vulnerable to the extension of departmentalism. Different regulations 
are implemented by different departments, resulting in mismanagement.^  
Consequently, market towns are ineffective organisations in the 
provision of necessary services and products, e.g. housing, sanitation, 
transport safety etc. Against this background, the lowly commercialised 
market towns do not function fully in speeding up the flow of resources 
and products. 
To illustrate with specific incidents, the relatively undeveloped 
and thin market for grain and some other cash crops is a source of 
pressure to peasants whereby they are bound to conform with the intent 
of the political authorities. Though the radical baogan daohu 
facilitates the release of labour from agriculture, the new system still 
implies certain administrative controls over acreages and assignment of 
grain, cotton sales contracts. This is indeed the major constraints in 
1. See "The details of the export-oriented rural enterprises" Guangdong She Hui Ke Xue 1988 
no. 3. " CCP strengthens her party branch control over foreign enterprise" Mi n* Pao 
13 June 1991. 
2. There are such cases in Guiding of Guizhou, see "Agricultural development in hilly area" 
Guizhou She Hui Ke Xuc 1983, no. 6. 
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areas stipulated by the state to specialise in grain and cotton.
1 
There are further cases of interference of local cadres in their 
personal interests. In the hope of increasing revenue both for the 
region and for their own, extra custom houses are installed to generate 
more revenue from passage levy. The market and supply cooperatives are 
organised under the control of village government, whose interests are . 
realised with the help of cooperatives at the expense of the peasants.
2 
In short, even a medium level of commercialisation, while generating 
additional revenue for the region, may induce interference from local 
cadres to squeeze out the added revenue by administrative measures. 
Extraction may also take the form of departmentalism,
3
 where the 
interests of departments reign over others. Rural enterprises have to 
count on the support of numerous departments for raw materials and sales 
outlets.^ 
The discordant development between the existing provisions of 
services for market outlet, processing, storage, transport, technology, 
1.The description is based on the case in Dahe Township located in the southwestern part 
of Hebei province, see Putterman,L. "Entering the Post-Col 1 ect i ve Era in North 
China: Dahe Township" Modern Chi na vol.15 no. 3 July 1989. 
2. This refers to the county of Zunyi in Gui zhou, see "To grasp economic reform and to 
promote structural adjustment" Gui zhou She Hui Ke Xue 1985 no.6. 
3. For a detail analysis on depart ment al i sm i n the context of bureaucratic policy making, 
see Lieberthal K. 4 Oksenberg M. , Policy Making in China: Leaders, structure.. and 
Processes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
•l.The county of Zunyi, in spite of recent development of few transport networks, cannot 
escape the control of departments, see "To grar»» economic reform and to promote 
structural adjustment" Gui zhou She Bt'i Ke Xue 19S5, no. 6. 
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information, loan and what is demanded by the specialised households 
engender the necessity of support from local cadres.
1
 However, the rural 
cadres, being jealous of the well-off specialised households, adopt 
uncooperative attitude to the nouveau riche. Various restrictions were 
imposed on the purchase of means of production and the drawing of 
contracts, e.g. the supply of forage, anti-pestilence. 
Apart from imposing restrictions, local cadres also attempt to 
squeeze the monetary surplus from peasants.
2
 Various items are 
instituted with a view to tax the peasants such as agricultural tax, 
purchased grain, treasury coupon, education surchage, tax on special 
products, irrigation surcharge, surcharges for militia training, 
expenses for veterans, compensations for cadres, etc. Distributions from 




Rural enterprises historically vulnerable to cadres' discretion 
(this case refers to Sunan) are not necessarily impeded in its economic 
1.The uncooperative attitude adopted by rural cadres towards the recently emerged 
specialised households can be located in the county of Changfeng in Anhui . See 
"The functions of professional households" Ji ang Huai Lun Tan 1983 no. 4. 
2. A brief comment made by the cadres points out that the above (rural government) extracts 
much from villages but feed back little to them. First, cadres would demand for 
grain (state procurement). Second, they would expect money (tax). Third, they 
would take away the lives of peasants (babies who may have been given birth). The 
findings are acquired from the counties of Nanpi ng, Longyan, Quanzhou and Putian 
in Fuji an. See "New developments of village society and the discordant elements" 
Soci olofli cnl st udi es 1990, no. 1. 
3. One catty of pesticide is allocated for each peasant a year. Impurities and 
underwei glit i ng are very common, ibid. 
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success as some may presume. On the contrary, i t is equally possible 
that strict capital fund apportioning under the discretion of former 
collectives can facilitate economic well-being in spite of governmental 
influence in the economic arena, given a previously well-established 
collective industrial infra-structure and a close proximity to market 
hinterland (Shanghai). Circumstances of Sunan (including the regions of 
Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou), would exemplify certain his tor ical 
speci f ic i t ies of coercive r i tual ism.
1 
Sunan has been an industrial base since the 50's. In 1985, the 
value of industrial and agricultural products accounted for 90.8% of the 
288 billion yuan, the total value of productivity in rural village. 
Significant transfer of fund is witnessed from the industry to 
agriculture, the so-called policy of using industry to subsidize 
agriculture. However, at the early stage of industrial development, 
contributions were made from collective agriculture to sponsor industry 
(it is estimated that 5 billion yuan was transferred from collective 
agriculture to industry during the developments of township 
enterprises)^. Apparently, the industrial and agricultural sectors are 
l.It is noteworthy to pinpoint the fact that the model of Sunan is primarily a case of 
coercive ritualism, which signifies an enormous collective involvement in both 
agriculture and industry. However, it is also a slightly deviant case of coercive 
ritualism in that the collective engagement in economic activities in Sunan is 
more a matter of construction to the local rural community than of usurpation. 
Similar empirical case as Sunan is quite rarely identified elsewhere. Therefore, 
it is being advocated as a model to other villages. The essence of its 
development is summarised in italics above. 
2. Other sources include the funds accumulated from the enterprises themselves and 
contributions brought forward from the enterprises workers. See "A compared study 
between the model of Sunan and Venzhou" Quarterly Journal of the Shanghai Academy 
of Soci al Sci ences 1937 no. 3 
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historically within easy reach of the government to appropriate, 
distribute and extract. 
Besides the fund allocation under collective decision, both flow 
of labour and source of information are also under the control of 
village administration. More importantly, information of various types 
is normally conveyed hierarchically in enterprises or acquired through 
informal networks
2
. To regulate township enterprises, at least three 
ways can be identified. First, direct intervention can be accomplished 
via village organisations. Second, industry, commerce, taxation revenue 
departments may exercise less direct regulation on the enterprises. The 
most remote way of control may resort to state economic plan. In short, 
the coercive ritualism has embedded in a context of historically well-
structured industrial collective, it is a step forward in the direction 
of rural resuscitation. 
1, The following diagram may help illustrate the village government can administratively 
control both agriculture and industry, 
Agricultural land use 1 construction - -(a)-
Agri cultural provident fund - village -(b)- township 
Agricultural labour force - government* -(c)- enterprises 
Agricultural loan - -(d)-
tVillage government here subsumes industry corporation, agricultural corporation, 
agricultural bank, credit union, village administration. 
(a) the original source of land premises for the enterprise 
(b) the original source of fixed accumulation for the enterprise 
(c) the labour source for the enterprise 
( d) the original source of mobile capital for the enterprise 
(extracted from "A compared study of the Sunan and Wenzhou model") 
2. Thin is regarded as the 'five friends', namely, village fellows, relatives, comrades, 
schoolmates and friends. 
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Concluding remarks 
Coercive ritualism, encompasses what the orthodoxical totalitarian 
model attempts to depict. That is, in a restricted peasant society, 
almost all significant aspects of life are being placed under state 
supervision and monitored by agents of state, the rural cadres. The 
control is coercive in nature for the commanding mechanism is embedded 
in the state structure long fabricated heretofore. Paradoxically, 
coercive ritualism revives in the wake of agricultural 
decollectivisation. 
This can happen provided the context for coercive ritualism 
crystallizes, as characterised by a low level of commercialisation, a 
high level of agricultural collectivity and a befitting policy aura. It 
is under these favourable circumstances that cadres can extend their 
guanxi to act as a client to the peasants by both legal and illegal 
acts. These three conditions are regarded as the essential conditions 
that associate with the incidence of coercive ritualism. An integrated 
state predominance over economic realms is normally not conducive to 
progress, both in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Usurpation, 
extraction, or at the best of situation, socio-economic disparity 
balancing, in lieu of progress, are the anticipated consequences 
resulting from coercive ritualism. That means, the state have the 
ability to govern but not to reform and construct. Order mediating 
between the government and peasants is channelled through governing, 
rather than betterment. Given a historically embedded industrial infra-
structure, it would be possible for governmental monitoring to be 
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effected to generate constructive contributions to the peasant economy. 
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CHAPTER 4 DIS INTEGRATED AUTONOMY 
In this chapter, the main ingredients of disintegrated autonomy-
will be sketched. Then a detailed description of the conditions 
associated with this type of government-peasant relationship will be 
delivered. Disintegrated autonomy endeavours to denote the situation in 
which the tri-actors - the rural government, the middlemen and the 
peasants - are in a state of disintegration so that none can dominate 
over the other two. Nor can any two of them can form an alliance against 
the other one since each of them is preoccupied with concern of their 
survival - the only kind of autonomy that they can enjoy - autonomy of 
survival. Poor areas have a high correlation with disintegrated 
autonomy, though the relationship is not a necessary one.
1
 The 
conditions associating with the disintegrated autonomy will be 
interpreted as followings. 
Nature of Agricultural Policies 
In studying policies pertinent to disintegrated autonomy, one must 
bear in mind that the widespread adoption of household responsiblity 
system would not necessarily dismantle the commune, production brigade 
and production team completely. What it does is it would disarray the 
organisation structure of villages. Collectivities have not been totally 
supplanted by the kind of agricultural production founded basically on 
1.Coercive ntujlisa and reactionary subsistanc* have been discussed and accounted for by 
scholars but not disintegrated autonomy. The ptausiblo reason may be that the 
r j t her low accessibility of this pattern of reljtionship diwninhes its 
t ransp-r-nry I o MC.il r - a 3 e a r c he r i. 
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individual basis. Indeed such supplantation has been trapped in between 
the two modes of agricultural organisations where chaotic episodes 
emerge.
1 
The adoption of the contracting system and the market in the place 
of monopolized purchase to collect agricultural products (though not a 
comprehensive replacement as some still remain in the list of 
monopolized purchase) began the mininal-mutual-interaction relationship 
between peasants and the rural government. Greater autonomy are then 
o 
enjoyed by the peasants. 
Level of Agricultural Collectivity 
In Hebei^ , after the abolition of the commune structure, 
collective agriculture has arrived at a stage where houses, property, 
tools of production and farm machinery previously owned by the 
collective are appropriated for re-distribution among the peasants. In 
this sense, the solidarity and centripetal force of the collective are 
1.The cane of Plngshan county in llebei and its dotal! M>UI d b « dealt with in the section 
of the level of societal collectivities in this chapter. See "To develop a new 
economic agricultural management structure" qefret ^ Ka„ 1 9S4, no. 4. 
2. See "Agricultural rconow c reform- UJ»Jll_ilMAL_iJ»JLJL4fl 19<i5 no. 5. 
1. Thi s i s a county of Pingshan. See 'To develop a new economic agricultural njni^acnl 
structure" qehei xue KJI1 !JS4 no. I. 
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diminished*. Instead of performing the function of a focus of service 
p 
provision, the village collective^ is now solely responsible for the 
collection of grains from the peasants. The peasants encounter 
difficulties in irrigation , acquiring inputs of agricultural 
production, seeking outlets for agricultural products, which would 
otherwise have been rendered by the former collective.^ The management 
of rural finance is not treated in due procedures (no accountants, nor 
book-keepers are employed), such that abuse of funds is the consequence. 
The entire rural governing hierarchy is at the verge of bankrupcy, 
whereby the establishment of rural cadres is left vacuum and that the 
1.Although in dccol 1 ect i vi sat i on the land is still graded, how to match the graded land 
with the expected output quota is not determined by the cadres. Therefore, 
contracting of farmland is not corresponded with production quota. Besides, the 
reserves for the collective is not well maintained and so is the remuneration of 
cadres. The management of farmland is largely flawed as no record is made on the 
transfer of farmland and no one pays heed to the amount of abandoned land. (Qi nan 
in the province of Gansu) See "To perfect the development of agricultural 
productivity ^ - r - i Economyi Society 1989, no.2. 
2.Despite the fact that the 'collective' here cannot connote the meaning of collectivity, 
the word 'collective' is still adopted here since it is customarily used in the 
context of China. For the sake of simplicity, this is used to describe the general 
rural organisation structure in lieu of constructing a new term for the prevailing 
st ruct ure. 
3. in the county of Yanjing in Henan province, in times of drought (after 
decollectivisation), the contracted households have to queue after wells for 
water. Excessive pumping of water from the well sped up the drying of the wells. 
Electricity lines have been connected with a number of motors by households, 
resulting in interruption of the electricity supply and fire. In 19S1, there were 
TO motors in the brigade, maintenance fees amounted to 2,000 yuan. See "Unified 
management and contracting to households in Xiaotan commune" 59c j ll Sciences in 
Chi n* 19S2 no. tl. 
The county of rut.an In tlebei province offers a succinct example. In the years of 
collective operation, a number of tasks have to be organised and coordinated by 
the collective: wvl 1 digging ( 10, 000 yuap estimated for the task, which is 
unaf f ordabl e to the individual households), machinery for the operation of wel I s, 
irrigation facilities and cuintenance, drainage (preventing silting), machinery 
fartang (tractors), husking, grain purchasing and conservation (combating against 
-Storage 3f pesticide, "sprinkling). See " Tw levels of management for the 
household respons. t>. I i « > system" Soc» -t> iQJLflfLgJi m '^ j-SA no.l. 
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government fails to guarantee for their emolument. Since policies do not 
give any assurance to the livelihood of rural cadres, the whole rural 
government appears impotent in implementing the contracting out of farm 
land, the developing of agricultural resources as well as the organising 
of unions among the industrial, commercial and agricultural sectors. As 
a corollary, policy execution against deforestation
1
, firing, 
unstipulated birth and gambling is ineffective. With the generally 
undeveloped rural enterprises, difficulty anticipated in forming 
economic unions would make integration, horizontal or vertical, almost 
impossible. 
It is still possible for the peasants to rely on agriculture after 
decollectivisation.^ Rural cadres are not bold enough to implement the 
policies to give incentives to the peasants. Neither effective control 
over production decisions nor vigorous backing on the development of 
agriculture and subsidaries are expected from the cadres. The peasants 
are left with free hands to resolve the issues of production, finding 
market outlet, transporting products to other parts of the mainland.
3 
What is happening in the rural governance would further exemplify 
l.In i he county of Yutian, forests and orchards of the collective have been cut down by 
individual households for their own sales. For instanco, a number of 220,000 trees 
had been pulled down to leave behind 5000. See "Two levels of management for the 
ho u tie ho I d reaponsbl I I ty system" <1S»S9>, ibid. 
2. In the counties of Wuqi , Zhi dan and Luochuan I n t be province of Shanml , there ic still 
above *jo"» peasants bonded with farmland. The value of crain products accounts for 
7S\ of the total agricultural product. See "To diucuns the ways that can improve 
i.ibi a. 
63 
how the rural community is being disintegrated.
1
 Cadres disclosed that 
increasing difficulties are encountered in accumulating funds for 
agricultural infra-structure. On the one hand, large scale investments 
would require such a large amount of capital financing that the peasants 
would not be willing to support the project individually, whose benefits 
would be capitalised on a considerable number of peasants. On the other, 
even with collective efforts to alleviate the difficulties, these may 
impinge unbearable burdens on the generally poor peasants, who are the 
o 
ones to shoulder the excessive expenses. Moreover, the duties of cadres 
o 
have not been executed properly. The rural agriculture is in a state 
1. Di si ntegrated autonomy theoretically precludes the possibility of collective action for 
the common interests. Therefore, it may logically follow that a coercive 
institution such as the government is necessary for collective actions, or large 
projects. This kind of argument can be found in 01 son, M. The Logic of Collective 
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1965. The main argument of this book is that if the members of a large group 
rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they wi 1 1 not act to advance 
their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so. 
Howver, it is propounded here that a coercive institution is not a requisite for 
collective actions for the common interests. That means, theoretically speaking, 
the implications of cither disintegrated autonomy or reactionary subsistence can 
embrace the possibility of vol unt ari st i c collective action without coercion. A 
theoretical demarcation of coercive ri t ual i sm f r om disintegrated autonomy and 
reactionary subsistence is thus possible. For this argument, see Hardin R. "The 
Social Evolution of Cooperation" in Cook K. S. I Levi M. (ed. ) The Limits of 
Rati o nal i ty Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990. 
2.This can be reflected by the amount of expenditure on agricultural investment. In the 
county of Chuxi an in Ajihui , before the responsibility system, the peasants' 
expenditure is mainly on consumption. However, the ratio of expenditure on 
consumption to expenditure on production has changed to 3:7. Of the 70X 
expenditure on production, 6/10 is for investment in fixed capital and raw 
materials for subsi dari es. see "The problems for the village development" 5ocj al 
SCI enci» i n Chi na 19*2, no-
1
' 
3. These may include the provision of services for agriculture, the acquisition of inputs 
of production (collective purchasing of chemical fertilizer, pesticide), the 
assistance during agricultural processing and after harvesting, the guidance to 
prevent plague, unified instruction on irrigation arrangements. It is not unusual 
far them to experience inadequacies in chemical fertilizer, pesticide, fuel, f^ rm 
machinery in rural areas. Even the peasants may get them through the open access 
to markets, the price-i are prohibitively high. Probably, the major problem for the 
radres is their negligence in Irawing, implementing and enforcing the contracts, 




 to which cadres pay no efforts in 
regulating
2
. In a few areas, the decollectivisation of agriculture is 
not proceeding with the energizing momentum found elsewhere, that is, 
the c o n c u r r e n t transformation of economic activities, or the emergence 
q 
of specialised households and the proliferation of rural enterprises. 
The fragmented land lease
1
* yields small and scattered farm lands. 
The scale of agricultural production is thus inhibited to the extent 
that the responsibility of irrigration, construction of drainage, 
farming by machinery, soil conservation becomes an impossibility to the 
individual households.
5
 Therefore very often the basic agricultural 
. . . Conti nued. . . 
the new path of development" Ji angxi She Hui Ke Xue 1988 no. 2. 
1. Some mainland authors may attribute the diminishing investment in agriculture to the 
non-compensatory transfer of farmland. However, this argument may mislead the 
readers. It is because the value of farmland is so low that people abandon the 
farmland or transfer it to others without compensation. The transfer of farmland 
is an indicator of the diminishing investment in agriculture but not the cause as 
deemed by the Mainland authors. 
2. The county of Nanchang in the province of Jiangxi may be one of the examples. See "The 
problems of deepening agricultural reform" Ji FW K<? 1988 no. 1. 
3.The lack of a concurrent transformation of economic activities leads to a restricted 
development of markets- both in the provision of information and loans, the 
essential elements of commercialisation. See "The reasons for the diminishing 
agricultural investment" -fj nngxi She Hui Ke Xue 1989 no. I. Other expositions may 
indicate the absence of outlets for the agricultural subsidiaries and 
unavailability of further processing. This is typical in the county of Llngtao in 
Ganau, where there is agricultural labour redundancy. See "Glut in agricultural 
labour force" Ke Xug (Gansu) 1093, no. 2. 
4.In the county of Chao Xi an in Anhui , some farmland is abandoned, 30, 000 acres in the 
district of Chao Uu. See "Agricultural nconow r reform" Jj ang HM^l Lun Tan 1995 
no. 5. 
5. Thi i ran be illustrated by example of the county of Vutian in Hebei. See "To develop 
r-ir.ll cooperative -rono« r organisations" ilS_bf! \U? Kail 19S?, no. 2. 
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I-
infrastructure is left idle. Furthermore, few can afford to invest in 
the purchase of such large machinery. Given the collective nature of 
investment in agricultural infrastructure, very few would have the 
initiative in investing. Consequently, agricultural conservation and 
construction are largely abandoned. 
A specific focus on cadres may enhance the understanding of the 
predicament in rural governance. In disintegrated autonomy, the team of 
rural cadres have experienced adaptative obstacles
1
 in response to the 
new problems generated by the responsibility system. Feeling constrained 
and impotent in face of the new environment, coupled with excessive 
workloads, few new comers are interested in taking up the post. What 
o 





l.In a survey conducted in the counties of Di ngyuan, Fengyang, Quanjiao and Ji ashan in the 
province of Anhui, of 68 party committee members (in 9 communes) and 208 branch 
committee members (in 41 production brigades), about 18X are not qualified and 12X 
not familiar wi t h the duties. See "The problems of the village development" Soci al 
sci ences i n Chi na 1982 no. 3. 
2.Both disintegrated autonomy anli reactionary subsistence may experience similar syndrome, 
that is, the incapability of rural government to execute daily duties. But the 
underlying factors for the similar phenomenon is entirely different. In 
disintegrated autonomy, it is the disgusting working environment and the excessive 
and demanding dutios that discourage new cadres to join the hierarchy. In 
reactionary subsistence, the main reason for the paralysis of the rural government 
is drawing of the local cadres by the attractions generated by commercialisation. 
This can be verified by the fact that the former one is usually identified with 
poor areas while the latter is likely to be associated with wealthy regions. 
l.In the above survey ( 5032 communes and production brigades, team cadres), it is roveal ed 
that 9. 5% are illiterate, 50\ have primary education, 7\ have high school 
education. 27. are those of «5 or above. 32. o\ have experienced land reform. It 
can be concluded that the crass root cadres ar«» rather I o w-Aduc a t e d and aged. See 
•The problems if vt I I a lie ,<e v,»l opment " Soci aj Sri on ces i n '!hi na 19S2 no. 3. 
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Level of Commercialisation 
In a production brigade in Guizhou after assigning full 
responsibility to the household (baogan daohu), the number of those 
engaging in diversified mode of agricultural production and processing 
is still limited (only fifty-two households take part in such 
diversified form of production in a production brigade, that is, 11.8% 
of total labour force).
1
 The explanation reported is the difficulty in 
finding market outlets for products of diversified agriculture. In fact, 
the rural cadres in this area are not active in participating in 
meetings in which economic and administrative messages are conveyed from 
the authorities above. Neither a strict control from the local 
authorities nor enthusiastic assistance*" can be expected in the rural 
administration and organisation. 
In other instances in Guizhou, the supply and marketing 
cooperatives can only purchase one-fourth of the peaches produced in the 
county.
3
 The peasants, in order to ensure the sales of peach, have to 
1.This refers to the gaol i an production brigade in Tianzhu county of Guizhou since the 
introduction of household responsibility system but before the di sunt 1 ement of 
commune. See "To doepen and wi den the diversified economic activities in hilly 
region" (jmzhou She Hui Ke Xue no. 2 1993. 
2. At the early poriod of household responsi bl i t y system, some households cannot manage to 
seize the profitable situation and get rich for the fear of the cadr es' j eal ous y 
towards their appreciable economic performance. Considering the possibility of 
shifts in agricultural policy, cadres would prefer to stand aloof from the 
everyday agricultural production. They would not be committed to the support to 
the peasants. See "A survey on two kinds of -households in Guizhou" GUI z hou She Mui 
Ke Xuf 1994 no.3. 
I.The county has produced twelve alhon catties of peaches but the cooperatives have 
purchased merely three a I I I on catties. -See 'To develop Agricultural individual 
househol ds" fjJU.jJlgJL-Th'r HVI * g _ J * 
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lower the price. The paucity of provision of daily necessary services 
and products for the peasants by the supply and marketing cooperatives 
is a characteristic feature in Guizhou.
1
. Several factors can account 
for the difficulties in the sales and purchases. First, the tendency for 
the monopolised supply and marketing cooperatives to place especial 
emphasis on those large sales makes them neglectful of small sales of 
9 
other agricultural produce. Consequently, the outlets for neglected 
produce are underdeveloped. Second, commercial network outlets are found 




 Third, the poor transport in the region 
accentuates the difficulty in economic transactions.
4
 The interference 
and support from cadres is minimal on the occasion. 
1.This includes the counties of Kai yang, Pudi ng, Wengan and Anshun. See "To develop 
agricultural individual households" Gui zhou She Hui Ke Xue no. s 1983. 
2. The Wengan county, in order to concentrate on the purchase of tobacco, has sacrificed 
other products. In 1980, the purchased agricultural by-products amounted to 
9,560, 000 yuan but the portion excluding tobacco only accounted for 2, 440. 000 
yuan (2SN). In 1981, the value of purchased agricultural by-products is estimated 
at 16,230,000 yuan but only 1,136,000 yuan (7\) of agricultural products were non-
tobacco. In 1982, the percentage of other by-products is even lower, about SX. See 
"To develop agri cul t ur al 'i ndi vi dual households" Qui zhou She Hui Ke Xue no. 5 1983. 
3. There were 25,021 production brigades and 222, 260 production teams in Guizhou. But the 
total comnmercl al network outlets run by the supply and marketing cooperative 
amounted to only 19,197, that is, one production brigade could be entertained by 
less than one commercial network outlet. See "To develop agricultural individual 
households" 3Jl& Hui Ke Xug no. 5 1993. 
j. The province of Gmzhou is 97\ hilly. It is estimated that about 700 communes that are 
not connected by roadways. Animals are still widely employed aa the mode of 
transport in hilly areas. Soe "To develop agricultural individual households" 
Gui ;hou she Hui Kc Xue no. 5 1993. The poor region of Ni ngxi a is also constrained 
by poor transport, through which goods arc difficult to be transported in and out 
of the red on. "Village and economic development in the poor region" '<) ntm a she 
Hut Ke Xue. l'JS6. no. 1. 
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In the county of Yutian,
1
 demand for agricultural services is 
high. There are needs for inputs of agricultural production
2
, technology 
transfer, information, produce processing, loans, transport, storage and 
sales. Meanwhile, the recently reformed village cooperative (the 
previously village group) has yet to accomplish the task, let alone the 
formation of some voluntary specialized economic cooperatives in more 
developed areas. In this case, the rural government, the middlemen and 
the peasants are by and large dissociated from one another. 
Similar situation can be found in Henan.
3
 Since the 
disorganisation of the collective, its property was rapidly appropriated 
by the peasants. And the entire village was in a state of organisational 
anarchy,
4
(particularly in poor regions) which can be attributed to the 
1. Hebei Xue Kan. 1989 no. 2 op. cit. 
2.In this paper, this general 1 y refers to cheia cal fertilizer, tractor, combine harvestor, 
agricultural medicine. 
3. This is in the county of Huangchuan of Henan. See "Weakening of village political 
organisation" sn^ i ol ogr t Soci 3) Rggggrch 1990 no. 4. 
4.This is reflected by the decreasing number of rural party cadres in the region. In 1984, 
there were 10,693 party cadres but 10,539 in 1988. From 1981 to 1983, the average 
annual increase of party cadros la about 75 In the county, that is, among the 247 
administrative villages in the county, the average annual increase of party cadres 
is less than one for three administrative villages. Furthermore, the aged 
population of cadres reveals that the young are not willing to join the hierarchy. 
In 199%, there w*re 10, 539 peasants holding party membership, those below 30 
accounting for II. 9%, those above 16 amounting to 46. 7\, those above 36 to 22.9\. 
-Weakening of village political organisations" Soci ol ogy <. soci pe-f oft ft no. I 
I' 10 0. 
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scarcity of rural enterprises.
1
 It is believed that by constructing 
rural collective enterprises and concentrating enterprises organisation, 
redundant labour force could be absorbed and diverted to rural 
accummulation and investment, yielding sufficient funds for rural 
reconstruction. The poor regions , uaually surrounded by hilly relief, 
experience difficulties in transportation, especially in gaining access 
to chemical fertilizer, pesticide, herbicides, fuels, markets and 
loans.
3
 This kind of region, might have a relatively large primary 
sector, such as Jingyuan in Ningxia.
4 
1. The number of collective enterprises is rather low, as compared to the proportion of 
individual enterprises. In 1984, there were 229 village enterprises, employing 
S740 people and generating 14,638,000 yuan value of product. In the same year, 
individual agricultural products yielded 193, 390, 000 yuan value of product and 
individual enterprises contributed 5.289,000 yuan. The proportion of collective 
enterprises to individual enterprises is 1:13.6. In 1985, the proportion is 
1:11.3. Until 1988, there are still 123 villages without any collective 
enterprises out of the total of 267, i.e. 46. IX vi 11 ages are without collective 
enterprises, "Weakening of village political organisations" Soci ol ogy A soci al 
Survey no. 4 1990. Similar situation can be identified in the county of Lingtao in 
Gansu. See "To develop township enterprises" Science. Economy, Society 1986 no. 4. 
2. Besides Henan, the counties of Zuoyun, Youyu, Pi ngl u in Shanxi similarly have poor 
trnasport, inactive purchase of agricultural products by the market and sale 
cooperatives. "Problems pertinent to the economic development in the poor region" 
Ji angxl She llui Ke Xne 1988 no. 5. 
3.There is one interesting consequence which is revealed in the study of the county of 
Huangchuan, which shares similar characteristics in the later stage of 
reactionary subsistance. The local anarchic and paralysed rural administrative 
machinery indirectly calls for the intrusion of the central state to maintain 
rural social order, possibly in the form of regulative device such as law. This 
is in fact the situation in rural China. However, the inadvertent state instrusion 
in rural society may not necessarily result in the desired outcome. The reason is 
that socialist state law in China is still not capable of demarcating the 
respective interests of the peasants and the state. See McCormick B. Pol J t i cal 
neform i n Post-.1?o Chi nj Dnrkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 
4.In the county of Jingyuan in VI ngxi a, the proportion of people employed in the primary 
sector IS about 90.6N while the secondary and tertiary accounts for 1.3% l 7.a% 
respectively in 1933. The national average is 73. 72%, 15.96% and 10.32% 
respectively. See "The economic thought of poverty- Sj neti a She Hm Ke 19SS 
no. 1. 
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Difficulty in gaining access to market outlets in other provinces 
has restricted the boundary of market hinterland. Anticipating minimal 
help from rural cadres, the rural enterprises respond by confining their 
markets to the surrounding areas in consideration of the poor transport 
network.
1
 The scope of market outlets is thus minimised, so is the 
dependence on rural cadres. To cope with the inefficiency of market and 
sale cooperatives, the common strategy is self-containment. Some poor 
areas
2
, albeit located in rich provinces, still find their development 
restricted by the lack of food processing industry, cooperative of 
agricultural-industrial-commerce, sale and market outlets, and 
employment opportunities. Another strategy is to have a nearby plant for 
further processing to reduce the need for transport.
3 
l.In 1987, when the 440 rural enterprises in the county of Fuyang in Anhui , were asked 
which the most annoying problem for the enterprises was, the answer was the 
absence of market outlets for the sale of product. In response to this, 72.6X 
rural enterprises tried to limit the market area in local villages. It logically 
follows that their reliance on rural cadres for market outlets was very low. 
"Dilemmas and outlets" Ji an* Huai Lun Tan 1989. no.2. Similar strategy can be 
identified in the peasants of Ji angsu. Rural enterprises deliberately develop 
their reliance on more accessible and reliable raw materials, technology and 
markets. For instance, rural enterprises in Ji angsu employ both agricultural by-
products and local industrial by-products as the inputs of enterprises. . Lime, 
stone, tile are the common products of rural enterprises which may find their 
market outlets easily at their disposal. See "To establish at villages" in jj ang 
nai Xue Kan 1994 no.S. 
2. The county of Di ngyuan in Anhui is traditionally a very poor area. Its relatively 
undeveloped agricultural husbundry and industrial processing has localised its 
rural development and segregated the area from other regions. "To have a strategic 
view point on the development of animal husbundry" Ji ang Huai Lun Tan 1983 no. 4. 
Another very poor county, Di ngxi , is also a typical poor area. See, "The property 
structure of the Gansu aroa" $<;j ?nc?.i—EspnPW, Soci et v 1996 no.4. In general, the 
province of Gansu haa been characterised by the weakened county government 
incapable of monitoring integrated development of the region, poor structure for 
capital financing and inadequacy of market town. This engenders the proper 
features of the disintegrated autonomy in which the peasants strive hard for 
survival. See, "To discuss the development of agricultural strategy in Gantu" 
Tlfr-I FC?n"-r- society I9S6 no.l. 
3. In general, this kind of strategies common to avoid cadre dominance. See 'The 
problems of coniracti n« Iiouseholds in Gui rang" Guizhon She Hip Ke yje 19^ 2 no.l. 
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Market and sale cooperatives, in general, perform the role of 
purchasing and sale functionaries. The market and sale cooperatives 
would experience decline in terms of its functions and numbers when the 
traditional cooperatives were not prepared to initiate organisational 
reforms.* For instance, with the rapid development in agriculture, 
animal husbandry and industry in some former poor regions (e.g. the 
autonomous regions), the market and sale cooperatives still restrict 
their role in the purchasing of inputs of production and the sale of 
agricultural produce and products. The cooperatives see no incentive in 
expanding the realm of services, whether in agricultural processing, 
provision of transport services and storages. So they continue to offer 
merely supplementary assistance to the peasants specialising in 
producing wool, poultry, or dried fruit. Wholesale service for 
industrial products falls out of the attention of the cooperatives in 
regions which previously deal mainly with agriculture. 
Local Pecularities 
The linkage between the rural government and the peasants in 
autonomous regions is historically mediated by leaders of the national 
minority. Cadres of national minority are supposed to be the ones to 
articulate official policies and to adapt them to the local context. 
However, in regard to their size and their technology level, it is 
l.ln the ael f-autonomous region of Xinjiang, of the total 583 market and sale 
cooperatives, 2/3 had withered away. 12 of then had been on the brink of 
bankrupcy, leaving a groat deficit behind. See "Making good for the market and 
y.ile cooperatives in the autonomous region" \jnjianj . Kf Xue 19S6, no. 2. 
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doubtful whether they can function effectively in integrating the 
interests of the local minority and that of the state. Their evident 
deficiencies in performing the duties widen and deepen the segregation 
between the rural government and the national minority. Because of such 
deficiencies, the policy intent from the central level is rarely given 
due attention in the region of national minority. One such case is the 
developing of rural enterprises.
1 
Cadres of national minority in N'ingxia are insufficient in terms 
of number to fulfill the developmental needs in the region.^  For 
, q 
instance, technological development is sluggish. As a matter of fact, 
a large number of national minority cadres is vital in transforming the 
less developed areas to a more developed one. Cadres of national 
minority find it difficult to implement policies, let alone rural 
development and construction.^  
1. See " Si ngxi a national minority cadre" Si ngxi a She Hui Ke Xue 19S8, no. 3. 
2. The proportion of cadres of national minority in 1958 and 1986 is 15.75% and 15.27% 
respectively. From 1976 to 1996, the proportion of cadros of national minority 
only experiences 1% increase every 5 years. Moreover, in 1996 the minority - Hui -
occupies 32. 36% in the region but the Hui cadres only amounts to 14.23%. "Ningxia 
national minority cadre" Nj ngxi a She Hui Ke Xuq 1998, no. 3. 
3.In 1996, in the whole autonomous region, there are 75489 technical cadres of various 
kind, of which there .ire 10132 natioanl minorities, i.e. 13.»2\. This figure 
(10132) amounts to 0.71% of Hui:u, which is proportionally smaller than that of 
the rest of nationalities. "Ningxia national minority cadre" Ni ngxi a She Hui Ke 
Xue I 9 S 9 , no. 3 
4. Ui ven the minimal assistance from cadres, the development of rural enterprises in this 
jioor region iu still immature. Despite the inception of rural enterprises, in one 
of the poorest regions in Ningxia, Guyuan, the number of rural enterprises , n the 
whole region • a not comparable 10 that of a small county in the provincial capital 
of M ngxi l , Vinchuan. Sen '•Discussions on the vill^n, ,„ national minority 
r " 21 o n " N j . n g x t J * . & r . _ I i 3 I ' t V i . s o . 
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Concluding remarks 
Disintegrated autonomy provides a sketch of loosened connection 
between the rural government and the peasants. The weakened mediating 
role of state agents is attributable to some peculiarities 
aforementioned. This is further consolidated by the compelled self-
sustenance of peasants. Encapsulated in a setting of a low level of 
commercialisation and a low level of agricultural collectivity, and 
provided with limited support from the cadres, the peasants have to rely 
on themselves for survival. The cadres thus find it unattractive to 
serve as the peasants' clients, and they start to vacate from the local 
government.
1
 The central state is directly and inadvertently permeating 
into the life of the peasants in the form of state law, which 
constitutes the backbone of the local order. (The local order of rural 
villages was customarily maintained under the auspices of local leaders, 
especially in self -autonomous areas. ) The decadence of the rural 
administration inevitably evokes a direct state-peasant encounter, 
where disputes and conflicts in the locality are resolved. The rural 
social order is thus maintained in a seesaw situation by the formalistic 
1. Devel opments in Ghana and Guinea indicate that in order to el ude from the impact of 
state deterioration, various attempts, collectively named as disengagement from 
the state, would be adopted by the citizens. They are the efforts to adjust to an 
environment of diminishing opportunities and increasing vulnerability. These 
include suf f er-manage, escape, parallel systems and r.el f-encl osure. However, its 
implications on action and order is quite different from that suggested for the 
rural China discussed here. The authors argue that the effect of disengagement has 
induced greater disjunction between centre and periphery and between polity and 
society, with a concomitant loss of the state's relevance to maintaining social 
order. They further contend that the state would not try to combat disengagement. 
It could reconcile itself to reduced control over a withdrawn periphery and even 
arrange for those in ruling positions to reap some profit from the situation. For 
details, ';ee Aznrya v., Chazan H. "Disengagement from the state ) n Africa: 
reflections on the experience of Ghana and Guinea" Comparative studies in Son.-tv 
.i ml History vol . Z't I "J s 7. 
7-1 
state regulations and guidance. 
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CHAPTER 5 REACTIONARY SUBSISTENCE 
The coinage of reactionary subsistence is to address the 
'fronting' relationship among the tri-actors. In its hard or soft form, 
the ultimate outcome would speak of the peasants' gradual departure from 
its passive dependency upon the rural government, and the local cadres. 
The availability of economic resources and social networks enables the 
peasants to become independent and mobilize support for its interests.* 
Reactions can be visible or invisible, mild to violent; the peasants, in 
either case, can maintain primary subsistence. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of the peasant's wherewithal at the disposal of the rural 
government and local cadres lessens as the sources diversified. 
Contradictions and conflicts, whether latent or manifest, characterizes 
reactionary subsistence in both rich or poor regions. 
Nature of Agricultural Policies 
The double-track price system is an attempt to widen the autonomy 
of the peasants. The binding force of contracts upon peasant is minimal 
as far as the peasants can contribute in monetary terms to the state 
instead of offering grains. Very often, the peasants delay the return of 
grains.
2
 Furthermore, especially for those poor areas, the amount 
1. A historical analysis contesting for an emergence of a honeycomb structure of local 
interests and solidarities that the state cannot completely penetrate, that is 
localism, is exemplary of the reactionary subsistence. Local i sm can be regarded 
as the form of reactionary subsistence that takes shape in a geographical 
dimension. Shue, V. rhe Heach of the State: sketches of the Chi ne-.e n0(jy rq i k t. r-
St.inford: Stanford University Press, 19SS. 
2. In the county of Yonijan in He i I o ng j i a ng, there are -.even villages that hive not 
fulfilled their obligations to the state since the drawing of contracts. See 
'Thought 'J f the farmland" in Son a I ogy L Soc^ aJ Re -.e arch 1-J'JO no.i. 
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stipulated for the unified purchase was set to be low. In other words, 
the grains could be sold back to the state at the negotiated price or a 
price near the market price. On one hand, this policy was intended to 
enliven the poor areas by giving concessions. On the other hand, the 
contraints imposed on the peasants in this region would be relatively 
fewer.
1 
Level of Agricultural Collectivity 
The increasingly scattered land lease of peasants makes it 
impossible for collective work, such as irrigation, to be coordinated by 
communes or brigades.
2
 However, a freer flow of farmland has its own 
merits.
3
 The deconcentration and rearrangement of land lease indirectly 
l.This refers to the counties of Guzhen, Fengyang, Wuhe, Huai yuan, Huoqi u and Jiashan in 
the province of Anhui. See "The economic impact of contracted farming" Ji ang Huai 
Lun Tan 1982, no. 5. 
2.In the city of Mudanjiang in Hei1ongjiang, there are 60798 acres of farmland being 
divided into 9614 pieces wi t h an average of 5.7 acres for each household. 
Machinery and capital-intensive farming techniques can hardly be used in these 
small patches. See "Thought on farmland" in Sociology k Social Research 1990, 
no. 1. 
3. Various forms of land contacting are seen. Some give the land back to the team, which 
manages the land contracting on behalf of households. Another way is to contract 
the land from individual to individual without any changes in the terms of 
contract without the intermediary of the production team. The decision on land 
resumption would be more flexible depending upon the discretion of the 
individuals. The third way is called private contracting. The distinction is that 
the contracting households have to pay back at a lower price grains to the out-
contracting households. The fourth one is exchanges among contracting households. 
Owing to the fragmented farmland of varying fertility level, management probl envs 
coaaonl y arise on the use of irrigation water, chemical fertilizer. etc. 
Therefore, the peasants would take the initiative to exchange their farmland in 
order to have a standardised combination of farmland. Not only will the peasants 
have incentives in farming their own I anil but also they may exercise greater 
control and improvement-, on their farmland. Greater individual autonomy can be 
regarded as a substitute for agricultural collectivity, see " Per mi in ons to t be 
exchange-; of farmland" Ji ang Ilu.n Lun fan 1>S». no.i. 
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facilitate the gradual emergence of specialised households*, which may 
diversify their businesses beyond the constraints of land or even gather 
a larger piece of farmland^  for agricultural specialisation (e.g. grain 
specialization).
3
 Yet the specialised households would not be entirely 
free from constraints imposed by the rural government or cadres.The 
acquisition of fodder is a significant hindrance to the specialised 
households, primarily due to the ministry's inability to deliver the 
fodder.
5
 Besides, to gain access to sales outlet is also difficult for 
the specialised households. Nonetheless, restrictions upon the peasants 
are not insurmountable and attempts have been initiated to manage the 
1. speci al i sed households in Anhui usually engage in one or two types of planting or 
husbandry. The revenue generated from this source averages to 50% or more of the 
total. The counties under study include Chuxi an, Fengyang, Quanjiao, Ti anchan, 
Ji ashan. See "To have a view on the specialised households" in Ji ang Huai Lun Tan 
1982, no.5. 
2. The nurturing of pigs, chickens, ducks, goats as wel 1 as the construction of orchards 
requires the gathering of scattered pieces of land. 
3. Experi ences in Guangdong and Anhui indicate that the peasants would abandon the farmland 
to become peasant-workers in enterprises. However, they may wi t hdhol d the farm 
land but not contract them out for the fear of policy reversal. See, "To have a 
view on specialised households" Jiang Huai Lun Tan 1992 no. 5. 
4.Data in Fujian also point out that the proportion of entrepreneurial households is lower 
in villages that have high levels of cadre activity. This relationship holds 
independent of the degree of market accessibility and of county location, both of 
which have positive relationship. But what constitutes in the content of cadre 
activity is not clear because it only signifies the number of meetings convened in 
the township and county gover nment s and attended by village cadres in the 
questionnaire. Nee, v. *. Young, F. W. "Peasant Entrepreneurs in China's Second 
Economy: An Institutional Analysis" Economic Development and Cultural change vol. 
39 no.2 1991. 
3 In \nhui . there was an instance that the county department cannot provide adequate 
fodder to the specialised household who in responsible for pig raising for the 
whole team. Ac J result, the contract drawn between the household and team was 
declared void .md the household had to ;el I the rest of the piijs. Soo "To have a 
vi .»w on specialised households" J tang tjuaj I.uq Tan 19S2 no.',. 
7 H 
above two obstacles.* 
The introduction of the household responsibility system and the 
subsequent disorganisation of the collective created additional tasks to 
cadres, such as the drawing of contracts. In fact, cadres encounter 
tremendous difficulties in executing birth control, drawing purchasing 
p 
contracts with the peasant and collecting grains from peasants. The 
rural cadres pay particular attention to these issues and are 
sympathetic towards the peasants because they would probably reside in 
the village after retirement. Their personal interests, which coincide 
with the locality's, supercede state interests. The local government 
o 
institution is on the brink of dismemberment. 
1. These in fact are the main differences from coercive ritualism. In reactionary 
subsistence, reliance on governmental institutional networks for resources would 
not be total. In this case, fodder company is encouraged to start their businesses 
and to establish contractual relationship with the specialised households. 
Companies specialised in the sale of agricultural products are now drawi ng 
contracts wi t h specialised household to assure their market outlets. Despite their 
immature development, restrictions on specialised households are intractable. See 
"To have a view on specialised households" in Ji ang II u 3 i Lun Tan I9S2, no. 5. 
2. widely regarded as agents and representatives of the state, the rural cadres are scolded 
by peasants when they are executing daily duties. There are some instances that 
peasants may threaten to risk their lifes with those of cadres when the rural 
cadres intend to sterilize the peasants or when the cadres want to collect the 
grain that would have been collected three or four years ago. When their one and 
only one child died, peasant (already after sterilization) would go to the cadres 
to redress their grievances. See, "Transformation of family forces and its impact 
on rural village life" Sociology * Socj a I Rygyafch 19S9, no. 3. 
3. In t M3 villages of Guangdong, out of 16 local cadres, ten have joined the government for 
more than 20 years and three for more than 30 years. The non-prestigious position 
in the local government diminishes the attractions of being a cadre. See 
"Weakeni ng of village struct ur«* and i I impact" Sociology »• Social I'^ i-arrh 19S9, 
no. 1. " Hefortmng t he village cadre >—. t <> ra i :: t he essential content to dee pe n the 
reform of .rural vi I ! age" Son ol SonJlLJig IS. ^ c h 1990 no. I. 
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In some other instances, the debilitation of rural governmental 
machinery is accompanied with the widespread grievances from the 
peasants.
1
 Because of the difficulty in acquiring means of production, 
the peasants tend to fight, scold and insult rural cadres.
2
 What 
logically follows is that the morale of local cadres is very low, which 
does not escape the eyes of the populace. The tension further mounted 
whenever the cadres strongly assert the power of the government, as when 
they collecting tax, further antagonism results. The instructions from 
the government and party will be acquiesced only when they are in accord 
with interests of the pesants. Consequently, the cadres are placed in a 
sandwich position, bearing pressure from both the provincial government 
and the peasants. Cases in Shaanxi and Henan give an apparent 
conflictual relations between the peasants and the officials who create 
chemical fertilizer shortages during the planting seasons in order to 
boost the prices. The peasants were looting fertilizer plants when the 
army was called up to guard the supplies. This violence demonstrates 
that the government lost control over its own functionaries and the 
populace and other branches of the governing authorities are required to 
3 
react the situation. 
Another palpable ,illustration of the reactionary subsistence, 
which is also subsequent to the dismantlement of communes, is found in 
l.This refers to t ho county of Tangyin in Henan. See "Administration organisation in 
Tangyi n in Uenan" sconce. Economy, Society 1999 no. 6. 
2.In this county, about 301 of the villages experience this situation and another l0*i 
have worse situation, ibid. 
3. Friedman E. "Demi versus the Peasantry: recol I ect i vt sat i on in the Countryside" Probl ems 
of communi sro vol . XXXI X Sept Oct 19 90. 
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a case study of development project sponsored by foreign funds.
1
 The 
event happened in the period of the disorganisation of communes. It was 
then that individual households were given greater autonomy and 
initiatives in production. The Gaopoling project in particular and 
development projects in general have come into conflict with peasant 
aspirations and activities. 
Origins of conflict are multiple. Firstly, the project was 
conducted on a land which had been traditionally regarded as wasteland. 
With the local government's tacit acquiescence, the land was freely 
utilised by the peasants, such as for the grazing of animals, periodic 
shifting cultivations, wood collection, etc. Therefore, control of the 
land was more subject to local pressure, rather than by the central 
government through the Ministry of Land Reclamation. The loosening of 
control by local government, the weakening of the commune authority 
structure under the production responsibility system and the aspirations 
of the peasant to utilise more land sanctioned by officials, all 
accounts for the climate favourable to the challenges levelled on the 
official authority by the peasants. 
1. Thi s illustration describes the Gaopoling Model Cattle Farm situated on the west coast 
of Hainan Island in an Autonomous Region forming part of Guangdong Province in 
southern China. John Ayres (author of the article) spent two years there as 
Project Manager responsible for the conduct and management of a development 
project jointly sponsored by the governments of Guangdong Province and Sew South 
Wal»»s. Gaopoling Model Cattle Farm i s a product of the 'sister state' relationship 
which has been established between Mew.south Wales and Gaungdong Province. 
Strictly speaking, this is a case of animal husbandry and pasture improvement but 
not specifically to peasants in planting. Yet it can exemplify the intricacy of 
the impact of collectivity agriculture. For details, see Nal son J. *. Ayres J. 
•Development Projects and the Production Responsibility System in China: a case 
study" Australian Journal of Chi n^ -.e Affairs !'JS4 Jan. no.u. 
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Conflicts arise when there are development projects which promoted 
a significant number of peasants looking for better land resources for 
production. Also, land needs of the project are usually at odds with 
the peasants' needs, so conflicts are likely to result. In Gaopoling, 
when the land is still currently of marginal use to the peasants, land 
development on the boundaries of the Li commune would not draw attention 
from the Li people. But once the land becomes suitable for cultivation 
and grazing, conflicts over the right to use the land emerge. * The 
Project Manager estimated that once the Australians have left, both the 
local and provincial officials may arrive at compromises to the benefit 
of the peasants at the expense of face and international goodwill. In 
this case, the conflictual situation between the local peasants and the 
government is triggered off by the presence of a foreign development 
project, which demands for a collective control over the land previously 
claimed by the local peasants. The aforesaid argument contends that the 
existence of large scale agricultural collectivity enables and 
facilitates governmental control over peasants. However, in this 
instance, the agricultural collectivity established by foreign intrusion 
would cultivate uneasy situation and nuisance between local government 
and peasan ts.^ 
X.In the Gaopoling area, the project was seeking to gain control over land use to secure 
pasture and cattle improvements but to the peasants, the land is a valuable asset 
for rice paddy. Another incursion is the right of land access continuously claimed 
by the peasants of neighbouring communes, ibid. 
2.It is recogni zed that there is a tendency for the local government to grant concessions 
in favour of the peasants (or leave them wi t h great autonomy) as this is a 
customary practice in areas traditionally plagued by local interests (in this 
case, Hainan Island) Si ven other things constant (i.e. without any foreign 
i nf I uenco). 
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Slightly distinct from coercive ritualism and disintegrated 
autonomy, the determining significance of the condition of agricultural 
collectivity in reactionary subsistence is ambiguous. The level of 
agricultural collectivity is not strongly associated with reactionary 
subsistence. But the structure of pre-existing collectives provides the 
requisite resources which nourish visible reactionary actions. The 
collective per se is both the issue of debate and the context for 
debate. 
Events happening immediately after the commencement of the 
household responsibility system can illustrate this polemic. Rich 
provinces feel the threat of the individualistic responsibility systems, 
and thus react by opposition to the new policy.
1
 The household 
responsibility system is also a threat to the base on which the rich 
provinces flourish. For instance, Jiangsu's agricultural success has 
been grounded mainly on large-scale water conservation and field 
construction projects, high grain output combined with above quota sales 
to the state. The contributions of commune- and brigade-run enterprises 
to the investment in agriculture also contribute to the success. 
However, the construction of projects in these rich areas is now 
by and large based on contracts, not administrative commands. With the 
l.Poor provinces, such as Anhui and Shaanxi , support the system of total responsibility 
but the richer provinces like Ji angsu, Zhejiang and Li aoni ng expressed their 
reservations. Zwei g D. "Opposition to change in rural China" As» an Sur vev 
vol.XXIII no.7 July 1983. It can be remarked that the genuine institutional 
change is susceptible to the wi I I i ngness of peasants. The reason for 
institutional changes can be attributed to the withdrawal of the so-called 
contingent consent, not solely the coercive repression. Levi,M. "A Logic of 
Institutional Change" in Cook, K. S. J. Levi M. (ed. ) The Li tm t s of Rationality 
Chicai'.o: The University of chicano Press, 1990. 
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allocation of grain fields to the household, the collectives find it 
diffficult to achieve above quota sales. The weakening of collectives 
attenuates fund accumulation, making further developments infeasible. 
The level of economic wealth and development directly determines the 
response of peasants to the new responsibility system. In wealthy areas, 
peasants fear the new policies
1
 for the threat to their economic 
interests.
2
 Strong brigade enterprises can boost the income of all 
peasants in the collective, not just those working in fields or 
factories. The peasants would voluntarily work under the collective in 
anticipation of greater returns. Additionally, mechanization of the 
wealthy collectives liberate peasants from farm labour. However, 
recognising that the use of machinery is going to be complicated by 
household quotas - essential target in farm operations among various 
households, peasants are dissatisfied with future developments.
3 
1.Peasants are not dissatisfied with the entire responsibility system but rather 
particular packages. In this case, it is the most decol 1 ect i vi sed form of 
agricultural production, the dabaogan. 
2. Dy deduction, the response of peasants in poorer regions would be mild or even 
supportive to the household responsibility system. For instance, in the Yenan 
District in the province of Shaanxi, peasants' living standard had not been 
improved for ten years from 1972 to 1982. In these areas, the collective has 
served as a fetter on the peasant, closing private opportunities and employing 
political threats to maintain collective production. Now the collective is 
dissolved and each household farms on its own, a situation that the peasants do 
not oppose. Zwei g, D. "Opposition to changes in rural China" Asj an Survey vol. XXIII 
no. 7 Jul y 1983. 
3.To quote the sayings of one team leader: "The peasants here work hard. They do their 
work quickly. If I
 v e
 them one day to do the work they do it in 1/2 day. So, if 
the people want to work on their private plots, they can. But most prefer to work 
on the collective fields. This year our income from the sidelines increased by 
7000 yuan, mostly because we sent more people to the brigade enterprises. The 
collective income ui 11 increase and the peasants know this. They can calculate. 
They know the collective income ui 11 increase. " The leader further explained, 
"Most people oppose the policy because there would be no collective economy, 
people fear "total responsibility" (dabaogan). They like the collective method 
(san bao >i jiang) because they get fertilizer, insecticide, and 35 points for 
managing the fields, all from the team. If they get sick and can't plant, the toam 
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Large collective works facilitate state intrusion upon peasants. 
Nonetheless, it is simultaneously a common arena on which reactionary 
resistence may be mobilized by lower level agricultural participants to 
respond against policies felt to be undesirable and directed from the 
central level. 
Level of Commercialisation 
In highly commercialised regions, peasants acquire their income 
from diversified sources and the accounting unit has shifted from the 
team or the brigade to individuals. Proximity to the market, urban area 
and transport networks become increasingly important in accounting for 
the sources of peasant income, implying the diminishing influence of 
cadres.
1
 Peasants can individually produce, sell and participate in 
economic activities (production of small communities) though nominally 
. . . Cont ioued. . . 
plants for them. Also, they will still get their grain ration." For details, see 
Zwei g D. ( 1983) i bi d. 
l.This can be vindicated by the results of a survey on 30 villages from tw peri urban 
counties in Fuji an. A sample of 725 households results in 624 completed 
interviews. The dependent variable, household income, is scheduled to be regressed 
by the independent variables, the pooled education attainment of the household 
head and spouse, the use of media, urban proximity, access to markets, former 
status before peasant entrepreneur (whether cadres or not). The results by and 
large suggest the gradual departure of the sources of peasant household income 
subject to the influence of cadres though the author attempts to suppress the 
possible influence of the status of those former cadres in effecting them to 
become peasant entrepreneurs. See Nee, V. "A Theory of Market Transition: from 
redistribution to markets in state socialism" American Sociological Review 19S9, 
vol. 54, Oct. When the data are re-analysed to account for the growth of mean 
pe r - c a pi t a income from 19S0-S4, labelled as econoo c growth, it is discovered that 
the quality of transportation fpcO.OOL ) and access to urban market (p<0.05), 
instead of marketing town and county town appear to be significant. Wee, v. 
"Institutional Change and economic Growth in China: the view from the villages" 
Journal .of Asi .in Studies 19. no. 1, FPb, 1990. 
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economic transactions have to be conducted under the commune. Exclusive 
of administrative charges, the portion of income which had not been 
registered jointly and listed in such things as bank statement could 
totally go to the peasants.
1
 The lack of a comprehensive fiscal system 
to match with commercialisation leads to the possibility that some 
individuals fall outside the taxation bracket. The market and sales 
person (fulfilling the same function as the market and sale cooperatives 
in providing information on sales outlet, inputs of production, help to 
draw contracts, etc.) are scattered individuals engaging in retail 
transaction and can easily evade taxation since the departments simply 
cannot obtain the relevant information from records.^  
The problem aggravates when there is a large number of individuals 
engaging in both agricultural production as well as retail transactions 
not connected with state enterprises, especially where transactions are 
mainly in cash unendorsed by banks. Tax collection, in order to be 
effectively accomplished, would have to be decentralised. As a result, 
the fact that the centralized ministries are burdened with the 
responsibility to collect tax only makes tax evasion even easier. In 
1.This is more common in areas of free exchanges and market, e.g. Wenzhou. see "New 
directions of the development of agricultural commodity product i on-Wenz hou 
village" Agrj rul turo. Economy and Society vol.3. 
2. Some remedies adopted in Wenzhou are by collecting the tax from the scattered 
individuals indirectly via enterprises which may have dealings with the 
individuals. It may well bo possible for tax burdens to be shifted to consumers. 
3. Trouser-maki ng in the county of Cangnan, plastic shoes in the county of Rui an, button-
.•naki ng in the county of Yongjia are uoine of the examples. 
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spite of strategies adopted to counteract tax evasion
1
, these are offset 
by the effect of fiscal shortcomings in quite a number of state 
enterprises. Cash transactions do not involve invoices issued by the 
ministries which also accounts for the bulk of evaded taxation.^  Market 
and sales persons (gong xiao yuan) are typical tax evaders whose taxable 
income is the sales registered at the transport and taxation ministries. 
By reporting a smaller value of goods sold, the market and sales persons 
can pay lesser tax. Rough estimates on the amount of tax evaded this way 
stand at 50% of the amount that should have been received. 
The market and sales persons are capable of substituting for and 
complementing to the function of market. Their influence is found in 
areas characterised by familial industries and agricultural production 
o 
essential to its viability. In Wenzhou, there are hundred thousands of 
market and sales persons, together with more than 400 markets they 
coordinate local familial industries with other regions by providing 
services in the purchase of raw materials, conveying market information 
1. The strategy in Wenzhou is to stipulate all invoices showing the amount of expenditure 
to be issued by the ministries. Taxes are collected at time of the issuance of 
invoices (industrial and commercial tax, income tax). 
2. In order to avoid tax, some individual enterprises merge wi t h township enterprises, 
which possess the privileges of tax exemptions. These individual enterprises not 
only can utilise the networks established by the township enterprises but also 
enjoy tax exemption in the first three years, the exempted amount being 
apportioned between the individual and township enterprises. This can be found in 
the county of Nanghai in Guangdong. Their scale is reflected in their number in 
the county. There are 749 enterprises in the county, 19,615 people working under 
these enterprises with the productivity value of enterprises estimated at 2.S339 
billion yuan in 1987. "Venture between individual and collective enterprises" Xue 
shu Van Ji u 199S no. 4. 
3. The region of Wenzhou including the counties of Yongjia, Le<ji ng, Dongtou, Ouhai , Hui an, 
Pi ngyang, Cangnan, Taishun and Wencheng in the province of /.hehiang ,ire 
illustrative of the .'Situation. 
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as well as draw ing contracts with wholesalers. The provision of loan 
services makes local capital accumulation possible. Combined efforts 
of individual households, market and sales person sis well as markets of 
various kind, such as those providing means of production, capital 
funds, technology, information and labour services
1
, can keep the 
reliance on rural government and cadres for gaining market outlet 
minimal. In fact, the actual involvement of the ministries in economic 
activities is very few in this region. 
Additional to the provision of market outlet other than the 
support from cadres, the wholesale transformation of economic activities 
in the region intrinsically help minimize reliance upon cadres. There 
is an increase in the number of familial industries on the basis of 
individual household and a corresponding decrease in the number of 
o 
people solely depending on agriculture . This implies that peasants will 
no longer resort to the nearly monopolised cooperatives for the supply 
of chemical fertilizers and other farm equipment. Instead, once the 
peasants can acquire raw materials from the market and sales person, who 
provide outlets to the products, the position of the peasants is hardly 
l.In Wenzhou, the market sector looms large in the provision of services. The agricultural 
banks and credit unions, which are usually directly regulated by local government, 
can only supply 20% of funds while the rest requires support of civilian capital 
market, which are now flourishing. See "Insights of Wenzhou agricultural 
commodity market" Zhe Ji an* Xue Kanl9S8 no.l. In fact, similar situations can also 
be found in other areas like Fuyang in Anhui , Suqi an in Ji angsu. "To realise 
several theoretical problems of the model of Wenzhou" ghejjang Xue Kan 1989 no. 5. 
2. The proportion of people specialising in agriculture has decreased from 99\ in 1979 to 
28.5% in 1995 in Wenzhou while the proportion of industrial productivity 
contributing to the total productivity value is 17. 6\ in 1990 and 37.5% in 1995. 
In Wenzhou, industries are of smaller scale on the basis of individual household. 
See "A compared study on the model of Sunan and the model of Wenzhou" Quart or I v 
Journal of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sci ences 1997 no. 1. 
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subordinated to the rural government and the cadres. 
The evasion and avoidance of the peasants is only one of the 
consequences of commercialisation. A positive aspect of 
commercialisation is the emergence of new economic cooperatives, which 
can be regarded as a functional alternative or equivalent of the 
market. Three types of economic cooperatives can be identified. First 
those cooperatives directly engage in agriculture, forestry, pastoral 
maintenance, subsidiary industry and fishery. The cooperatives may be 
merely a kind of cooperation specialising in nurturing silkworm, animal 
husbandry, etc. The second type specialises in the processing of 
agricultural subsidiaries, such as mining, weaving, etc. Third, the 
cooperatives may provide services for agricultural production, like 
export services. Provisions also include phosphate fertilizer, 
irrigation networks, afforestation, etc. It is the last type that is 
most akin to a functional alternative of market.
1
 Some cooperatives may 
even command market outlets of wide geographical coverage.
2 
1. One of t he mai n di sti ncti ons of t he new economi c coo per at i ves f rora t hat of t he noti on of 
agricultural collectivity mentioned before is its independent and sel f-f i nanci ng 
nature, with its internal operations quite immune from cadre influence. These new 
economic cooperatives cannot mobilize or distribute such resources as property, 
funds and labour force like the agricultural collectivity (commune enterprises and 
the later township enterprises). These cooperatives have to be self-reliant in 
financing, sourci ng of raw materials and markets. Both profit and loss have to be 
borne by cooperatives themselves. The situations described only allude to Anhui 
t hough other areas may share similar characteristics. See "The conditions and 
characteristics of new economi c cooperative" in Ji ang Huai Lun Tan 1982 no. 5. 
2. This i an invention i n t he Pearl Delta which was historically established. A typical 
example is the banana transport and sales organisation which sent 300 people to 
the whole country to offer for sal e resulting in a country wide sal es network. See 
"The agriculture i n t he Pearl Delta" Guangdong She Hui Kc Xue 19S7 no.l. 
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Specialised households may countervail various restrictions in the 
access to sales outlets by creating their own networks. They would go to 
the vicinity to gauge the needs and to adapt their own products to the 
demands. The formation of cooperatives among the specialised households 
further expand their market outlets to the nearby counties.
1 
Specialised households near a navigable river have the advantage of 
water transport. The expansion of market outlets and the purchase of 
inputs of production are largely facilitated by the presence of a 
2 
river. 
The greater autonomy enjoyed by the peasants can be reflected from 
the moves of cadres. Some rural cadres, especially production team 
leaders, abandoned the original post during the reform period so as to 
o 
accommodate the responsibility system.
0
 In 1982, the provincial press 
reported that hundreds of production team leader positions became 
1.This is the situation in Chaohu, Wuwei , Hanshan, Huai nan. See "Specialised households 
are now deepening and widening the commodity economy" Ji ang Huai Lun Tan 1984, 
no. 4. This area is regarded as a small typical economic zone. See "The 
realisation of agricultural specialization" Ji ang Huai Lun Tan 1986 no. 4. 
2. The products of the specialised households in Chaohu can easily reach the areas of 
ilefei, Nanjing, Wuhu and Maanshan. Most of the agricultural by-products and 
construction materials in Lujiang are transported to Hefei by water transport. 
There are 10, 400-speci al i sed households employing their own motor boats in the 
region. The problem of gaining access to market outlets and purchasing means of 
production can thus be alleviated. See "Specialised households are now deepening 
and widening the commodity economy" Ji ang Huai Lun Tan 1984, no. 4. 
3. The withdrawal of cadres from the post in reactionary subsistence is distinct from that 
in disintegrated autonomy by the fact that the former one abandoned their post for 
the better alternatives available in other channels in commercialisation. It is 
the improvement in economic situations and the increase in conflicts arisen 
between cadres and peasant that pull the cadres out of the hierarchy. Materials 
adopted here are based on an article examining the press in the provinces of 
Guangdong, Fuji an, Zhejiang, Ji angsu, Sichuan, Li aoni ng, Shanxi and Heiiongjiang 
and a series of interviews with migrants mostly from the provinces of FUJI an and 
Guangdong. See 3urns J. P. "Local Cadre Accommodation to the 'Responsibility 
System' in Rural China" Pnci f i c Af f ai rs 19S5-S6 no. I vol . 3S. 
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vacant in Zhejiang, Fujian, Sichuan and Guangdong.
1
- Official sources 
gave a variety of reasons accounting for the vacancies, suggesting the 
increase in quantity and complexity of the tasks, the lack of prestige 
among villagers and their insecure and low remunerations. The large 
number of former cadres becoming wealthy specialized households with 
their previous informal authority networks
2
 indicates that the cadres 
have actually been alluded by the attractive alternatives unfolded 
during the process of commercialisation. On the one hand cadres in those 
wealthy regions experienced gradual loss of a privileged position, on 
the other, the entire establishments have been corroded by the 
blossoming peasant economy, reinforcing the vigor of the sprouting 
economy. 
Local Pecularities 
A survey on the problem of rural management directly address the 
operations of local organisation in villages.^ In which conflicts over 
l.In the county of Lunghai in Fujian, it was reported that 20% of the county's 3,700 
production teams had their team 1 eadershi p posi ti ons either vacant or held 
norai nal I y onl y, i bi d. 
2. In 1983, authorities in Shanxi carried out a number of surveys on the background of 
specialised households whose income is higher than the average peasantry. In one 
survey from Yi ng county, 43*. of specialized households wre reported as current or 
former brigade or production team cadres. In other surveys, of the 250 households 
in the Shanxi counties, 47\ wxjre or had been cadres, while 26.6% of 304 
specialised households in another Shanxi county came from a cadre background. 
Burns, J. P. ( 1955-86) ibid. 
3. The fi ndi ngs are based on a survey targeted on township committee secretaries and 
count y • t owns hi p party secretaries (making a total of 393 cadres) in nine counties 
of the Yi bi n region of Sichuan. "Present village social problems" Sociology n 
Soc:i aj Research 19SS no.S. 
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farmland and irrigation are found to be the prominent problems of rural 
management to the rural cadres. To counteract the rural cadres, the 
peasants count on the support of kinship members, rather than the 
neighbourhood. The mobilization of resources within the family and the 
kinship is subsequently reinforced, which makes it more difficult for 
the rural cadres to execute rural administration, especially the 
regulation of economic activities.
1
 The rural social order, ensnared in 
the context of debilitated local administrative machinery as well as the 
augmentation of kinship network, can take its shape only with the help 
of direct law regulation from the state.
2 
The commencement of household responsiblity system in rural 
.villages has stimulated the re-emergence and growth of the natural 
collectivity bound by lineage. The re-mobilization within one's own 
lineage in rural villages is regarded a strategy to strengthen one's own 
power base vis-a-vis the opponent. This is most often employed in 
conflicts such as land allocation, chemical fertilizer allocation, 
irrigation, electricity and contract deal. Sometimes, connections would 
be deliberately contrived by marriages to distant area to extend 
networks for market outlets. 
1.This is as reflected in the response of the rural cadres to the question of which aspect 
is the most difficult in rural management. 45. 79% gave ineffective means of 
regulating economic activities. "Present vi'l I age soci al problems" Sociology n. 
Soci aI Research 198S no.5 
2. 60. 11S of rural cadres answered that state lawWS the sole existing means available to 
monitor rural social order. "Present village social problems" Soci ol oify K Son al 
He so a re h 19S5, no. 5. 
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The resuscitation of lineage is found also in the rural villages. 
The rural cadres exert their control over areas as water sources, 
chemical fertilizer, electricity, large agricultural machinery, 
selection of school teachers, implementation of birth control, 
collecting of grains, issuing recommendations and testimonials to 
peasant for transfer to urban enterprises. As can be seen, their 
influence spans across the whole spectrum of life of the villages. 
Decisions concerning the villages bear implications on the respective 
lineages. The election of cadres and their subsequent performance 
closely relate to their lineage background. Peasants as team leaders 
find their kinship ties more indispensable than the organisational ties 
legitimized by the government. As organisations, kinship and the 
government are intermingled,
1
 it is therefore beyond the rural cadres' 
capability to adjudicate village affairs. Rather, they play a 
o 
reconciliatory role over the various interests of the village. Still 
1. Potter, S. II. "The Position of Peasants in Modern China's Social Order" Modern Chi na 
vol .9 no.4 Oct, 19S3. 
2. The cadres regarded their work as half-public and hal f-pri vate. In another instance, of 
the five village cadres, three have their kinship and marriage relationship tied 
up wi t h the local interests. In the county of Xi angfen in Shanxi , family names 
dominate. Li an and Li are the major two while Mao and Zhou follow. The Li an family 
occupy most cadre positions. This is based on the survey on the counties of 
Linfen, Zhangzhi and Yanbei in Shanxi. See "Transformation of family forces and 
its impact on rural life" Soci ol oKv X. Social Research 19SS no. 3. The limitations 
in the power of the village head can also be found in Guangdong. The head of the 
team favoured the daughter of one of his relatives, and he encountered severe 
criticism for this. Later, the production brigade organized a general meeting in 
order to reconcile both parties but to no avail. Two months later, the villagers 
elected a new head. See Thi r o au, I. " Rec e nt Changes in a Guangdong village" 
Australian Journal of Chi nose Affairs' 10 2 0 1 'J S S. 
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violent conflicts can be identified in rural areas.
1 
Aside from the conflicts over agricultural production, the 
antagonistic relationship between peasants and cadres can also be 
reflected in the everyday life of peasants^ . Conflicts over tomb 
visiting have been initiated by heads of clan, which had been 
temporarily settled by cadres years ago. Most common property like the 
pasture, officies of cadres, and collective clinics are the targets of 
destruction, which was done in the disguise of grave visiting. 
Concurrently, there was the rise of clans, which are organised in 
actions against the rural cadres. This prompted the special attention of 
local cadres, but not always reaction, to deal with the situation^. It 
can be concluded that the gradual process of becoming autonomous among 
village communities from the state and from the local administration 
1. Apparent conflicts might arise when peasants demand for the resumption of land 
confiscated during the land reform. This mobilization was mystified by the 
campaigns for the worship of god. Although a number of peasants were arrested, the 
rural cadres were threatened by them for their interference in their domain. Dung 
was thrown to the cadres and doors of cadres were pulled down. Only after quite a 
long period could the cadres resume duty. This is found in the county of Ji exi in 
Guangdong. "Weakening of village level governmental structure" Soci ol ogy g. Soci al 
Research 1989 no. 3. 
2.In regard to the everyday form of peasant resistance, see Scott J. Weapons of the weak: 
everyday forms of peasant resistance New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. Also 
his summarised and extended essay, "Everyday forms of resistance" in Col burn F. D. 
(ed. ) Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance London: M. E. Sharpe, 1989. 
3. With special reference to the counties of Loudi , Xinshao, Lengshujiang, Li anyuan, 
Longhui and Anhua in Hunan province, there are series of conflicts arising from 
grave visiting. Those participated in the mobilization include heads of the clan, 
cadres of production team, retired cadres. For instance, in 1933 the 'Duan' clan 
in Lengshujiang joined the * Duan' mass in.Xinshao to destroy the premises of 
cadres. They did this in the name of the restoration of the aged grave, costing 
10,000 yuan. Another instance reflects the weakening of local authority. In the 
period of campaign modelling agriculture for Dazhai, the Liu clan occupied the 
land of Pang for the accumulation of organic fertilizer. Now, the cadres can do 
nothing but stand to witness the conflicts, which are later resolved by the court. 
See "To observe the conflicts over grave of villages" she Hui 19^ 3 no.t. 
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allowed greater room for the reappearance of competitive struggles 
between villages. The conflicts would surface in festivals, like the 
dragon-boat race and ancestor worship on Qingming Day, etc. 
Last but not least is the impact of cash crop. Areas rich in cash 
crops like vegetables and fruits are subject to pressure from the 
central state in time of grain procurement. It would be conflictual to 
impose high grain quota on peasants who acquire their large portion of 
income from cash crops. In some instances, there would be open conflict 
on the setting of grain quota but mostly, village cadres appease the 
peasants by cheating the commune cadres for more cash crop fields.
1 
< 
L.See Si U U. F. Agents and Victims in South China: accomplices in rural revolution Hew 
Haven: Yale University Press, 19S9. The cooperative attitude of village cadres 
with the peasants would depend greatly on their origins, i.e. whether they work 
for their own villages, and their source of remuneration. 
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Concluding remarks 
Reactionary subsistence endeavours to capture the dismembered 
state machinery in the locality and the reactionary, self-aggrandizing 
and self-metamorphosed peasant society. The reasons for the weakening of 
local rural government is not so much a matter of vacated cadre ' 
establishment, which is a sympton per se, as a matter of the inability 
of the state to retrench from the peasant society. In fact, this peasant 
society is imbued with the energetized economic and social impetus. The 
inability of the state to withdraw from the peasant society in an 
appropriate pace leaves the peripheral governmental structure 
unprotected and open for the erosive force of the peasant society. 
Without diminishing the number of rural cadres establishment and 
insisting on maintaining the rural administrative apparatus intact as 
well as implementing a considerable number of over-burdened tasks only 
propels the rural government into a position of turmoil and bankrupcy. 
Unless the role of rural government can be retreated to a regulatory 
function, the local administration will continue to deteriorate. 
Concomitant with this weakened rural government machinery is the 
forefront agents of state facing the alluding motive of peasant society, 
which renders the disintegration of the teams of cadre. Rural cadres 
find it increasingly difficult to perform the role of state agents. The 
lucrative prospect of involving in the rapidly developing peasant 
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economy poses a constant temptation.^  Societal conflicts as clan 
conflicts, remain a source of frustration in their job. The rural social 
order is only laxly knitted by the formalistic state laws, similar to 
the situation in disintegrated autonomy. However, the circumstances in 
reactionary subsistence is much less stagnant than that of disintegrated 
autonomy and the consequent formalistic order prescribed by state 
regulations are even more fragile. 
< 
1. Similar cases can be identified in Hungary, one of the socialist countries with a 
widespread capitalist institutions. It is argued that the existing entrepreneurs 
are people who come not from the most depressed or traditional backgrounds, but 
from those most devoted to entrepreneurial activities before the Soviet 
occupation. They can become entrepreneurs as they can maintain a certain degree of 
autonomy, i mmuned from 3 full-scale cadr ef i ca t i o n or proletarianization. See 
Szelenyi I., Manchin R. , Juhasz Pal, Magyar Dal I i nt, Martin Bill, soci a I i st 
Entrepreneurs: Embourgooi ;;ement in Rural Hungary Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 19$$. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, a recapitulation of the arguments employed will 
be restated and summarised here. To have a more explicit articulation 
on the reflections of this thesis, several remarks on the findings in 
relation to the three perspectives synthesized in the introduction will 
also be drawn here. The entire study is to carve out the possible types 
of government-peasant relationship on the basis of separate, scattered 
and discontinuous reports, surveys and other published empirical data. 
Three types of relationship are identified - coercive ritualism, 
disintegrated autonomy and reactionary subsistence, which can be 
regarded as the major patterns of government-peasant relationship. Apart 
from a mere description of the three types of government-peasant 
relationship, this thesis endeavours to specify the corresponding 
conditions associated with these three patterns respectively so as to 
form a coherent configuration. 
To begin with, it is necessary to qualify the contestation 
portrayed in the preceding chapters. In order to have a typical major 
pattern to describe the government-peasant relationship, certain 
distortions of reality would be resulted in some respects. To gravitate 
closely the empirical reality, the three typical patterns can 
individually be comprehended as a melange of three, which is 
characterised by the predomination of one constructed type. In spite of 
the possibility of concurrent existence of the three types and the 
incidence of predomination of one over the rest in one situational 
context, it can squarely address the reality more appropriately. This 
may indicate one constructive way to appreciate the usefulness of the 
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three typical patterns of government-peasant relationship. 
To explicate the seemingly complicated relationship among several 
variables presented previously, the following table may help elucidate 
an integrated view. 
Coercive Disintegrated Reactionary 
Ritualism Autonomy Subsistence 
Nature of ! J | 
Agricultural ! strict ! ineffectively i loose 
Policies ! J implemented ! 
Level of | i J ambiguous 
Agricultural i high i low J (high & 
Collectivity ! ! ! low) 
Level of ! J J 
Commercialisation ! low \ low J high 
Local ! state self- J existence 
Peculiarities ! interference i autonomous ! of kinship 
! in a j minority ! lineage 
! historically J nationality ! 
! well-established ! J existence 
! industrial | J of 
! infrastructure ! J cash 
! ! ! crops 
Fig. 7 Conditions associated with the respective government-
peasant re la t i.onsh i p 
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The essential conditions of the three types of government-peasant 
relationship are to be reiterated. Low level of commercialisation (poor 
development of transport and market outlet) and high level of 
agricultural collectivity (concentrated land lease, existence of large 
development project, highly-industrialised rural enterprises) together 
with strict micro policy context would largely attest coercive 
ritualism. Disintegrated autonomy is characterised by a low level of 
commercialisation and a low level of agricultural collectivity. The 
essential condition that advances the autonomy of peasants is the high 
level of commercialisation. The presence of agricultural collectivity in 
reactionary subsistence may become a self-rebellious arena in which 
contest exists between the government and the peasant, formerly an 
indirect device for state penetration. Some local peculiarities would 
certainly reinforce the reactionary elements. 
This paragraph summarises the prevailing pattern of the 
government-peasant relationship in the post-Mao rural China. In terms of 
the number of peasants and the geographical coverage in which the source 
of peasant income is generated, reactionary subsistence is disputed as 
the most decisive one in comprehending the government-peasant 
relationship. As mentioned before, provinces in coastal areas populated 
with the greatest percentage of people by and large demonstrate 
characteristics of reactionary subsistence. Basically, peasants can 
enjoy greater autonomy in making their own livings. By forming voluntary 
j 
economic associations to explore inter-provincial transactive exchanges 
and diversifying their conduct of economic dealings, like the familial 
industries, the peasants can be relatively free in making their economic 
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and production decisions. The widespread emergence of peasant 
entrepreneur in the form of specialised households accompanied by 
numerous individual private retail households enables a minimal reliance 
on the rural cadres for the market outlet.
1 
Peasants may in sometimes rebel against the village government and 
cadres. Violent attempts to acquire the means of production from the 
rural cadres are not uncommon. In the name of celebrating traditional 
festivals and some customary rural rituals, the.peasants may redress 
their grievances against the rural cadres. The rural cadres, on the one 
hand, have to implement the burdensome policies
2
 which they are 
unfamiliar with. On the other, they are facing with attractive money 
making opportunities outside the state sector. Having the access to 
networks, former cadres are potentially successful peasant 
o 
entrepreneurs. The recent trend seen in the fleeing away of cadres from 
the village government reflects this situation. Many tasks that should 
have been the duties of rural cadres are left unattended. 
l.See the exposition of Wenzhou model as an example, Nolan, P., Dung, F. , (ed. ) Market 
F o r c e s
 in China: competition and small business, the Wenzhou debate London: Zed 
Books, 1990. < 
2.1 mpl ementati on of many daily routine tasks is necessary for the success of rural 
reforms, such as administering contracts, dividing farmland, appropriating means 
of production, maintaining collective means of production, like tractors, large 
sprayers, threshers, etc. It is through the execution of these duties by the 
cadres that the rural government can function in a less burdensome and less 
circumscribed rural context. As a consequence, successful retreat of governmental 
control on the peasants is greatly contingent on the committed execution of duties 
by t he cadres. 
3. However, t hi s wi 1 I be most prominent when the profitability of engaging in business is 
evident. Otherwise, rural cadres may prefer to stay in the village government, 
especially the cadres reaching retirement age. In time of uncertain polio-
direction, the mentality of "wait and see" among the rural cadres may convince 
tliora to retain in the government. 
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Based on the above, it is contended here that the state structure 
has been inextricably enmeshed in a dilemmatical local context. While 
the village government has been reorganised along the structure of 
communes and production brigades, it is encouraged to implement a wide 
array of decentralising policies, in which they have no previous 
experience. In the locality, the state structure is susceptible to the 
local disintegrative momentum represented by the non-state economic 
forces and societal corrosive forces.
1 
In fact, the state in the local context is retrenching de facto, 
albeit unwillingly, as reflected by its inability to implement 
decentralising policies. The socialist China at its transformative 
stage, being given a considerable degree of commercialisation, sees its 
substantial elements for realising the state intent gradually 
evaporates.^  What is left behind is a vacated and decadent local state 
infra-structure.^ Its incapability can be witnessed from its inability 
to extricate from the web of local interests. Even so, the constitution 
of the local order becomes a vacuum because of the weakened local 
administrative apparatus and the withdrawal of rural cadres. 
Consequently, the state-society confrontation is directly and inevitably 
1. For a detailed description of the significance of lineage in affecting the daily rural 
administration, see Potter S. n. , Potter J. M. China's Peasants: the anthropology of 
a re vol ut i on Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
2. This can be demonstrated by the continuous freeing away of rural cadres and the 
subsequent vacancy of rural administration. 
3. The concept of state infra-structure is extracted from Mann, M. "Autonomous Power of the 
State: its origins, mechanisms and results" in Hall J. A. State in Hi storv Sew 
York: Basil B1 ackwel I , 19S6. In rural China, the situation is that there is an 
elaborate state infra-structure, but not state infra-structural power. 
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embroiled within the formalistic state law which is the basis 
constituting the local order, rather than the traditional local cadres. 
The next thing discussed after the major pattern of government-
peasant relationship prevailing in the post-Mao era is its relationship 
with the three perspectives synthesized in the introduction. The neo-
institutionalists believe the process of state retrenchment as symbolic 
of the government-peasant relationship in the reform era. This argument 
is in line with the accounts of both empirical researches and logical 
deduction of the government-peasant relationship from the preceding 
period.
1
 The implication of clientelism on the government-peasant 
relationship is a supposition of the local cadres' control over the 
peasants. For the proponents of localism, the government-peasant 
relationship in the reform era is discerned in the intended, 
strengthened state capacity in the rural context, as exemplified by the 
various reform policies. This argument also shares certain deductions 
1.Reforms in the near decade relax stem state control on grass root level. It is 
commonly maintained that there was a totalitarian state control on peasants in 
Mao's era. For details, see Whyte M. K. , Small Groups and Political Rituals in 




 Liigg and Family in Contemporary China Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 
1978, Schurmann F. Ideology and Organisation in Communist China Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966. For specific case studies on the Maoi zed way 
of life and rituals, see Chan A., Madsen P., Unger J., Chen Vi I I age: t he recent 
h' story—of a peasant community in Mao's China Herkel ov: University of California 
Press, 19 8 4, also, Madsen R. , Morality and Power in a Chinese Vi 1 I age Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984. The latter one has more elaborations on the 
types of local political leadership in rural China. 
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from the historical perspective.
1 
Anchoring at the findings of this thesis, the above implications 
of the government-peasant relationship from the three perspectives 
appear to be insufficient . to describe the major pattern of the 
relationship. Neither the premise of state retrenchment nor state 
strengthening can be employed independently to detect the dynamic 
relationship between the government and the peasants. It is the 
inability of the state to withdraw from the local rural context that 
constitutes the main features of the government-peasant relationship. 
The resultant situation is the local state apparatus become entangled 
with the rural web-like interests and the subsequent debilitated rural 
administration. 
The third endeavour of this thesis is to offer interpretations on 
the seemingly scattered, fragmented and contradictory observations of 
the government-peasant relationship. This work seeks to provide the 
respective conditions under which the relevant government-peasant 
relationship may flourish. By doing so, insights for assessing the 
importance as well as the pervasiveness of the current empirical 
findings on the relationship between government and peasant can be 
l.It is believed that villages before the onset of communist regime are quite impermeable 
to the penetration of imperial state. See, Huang, P. C. C. The Peasant Economy and 
Social Change in S'orth China Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19S5, Fei , H. T. 
Peasant Li fe i n Chi na, Duara P. Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 
1900-19 12 Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19S9. With the inception of the 
communist regime, it is even argued that this situation is further reinforced by 
the party and administrative machinery in the local context. Reforms in the post-
Mao era are maintained to strengthen the state i n t he local context by breaking 
down the so-called cellular structure of the rural village. See Shue, V. The Reach 




obtained. For instance, it can be succinctly put forward under which 
conditions the so-called peasant autonomy can be realised. 
Fourthly, and more importantly, the notion of disintegrated 
autonomy enhances our understanding on the government-peasant 
relationship. The three perspectives based on current empirical findings 
are being synthesized for analytical purposes. The actual incidence of 
clientelism can be theoretically incorporated under the heading of 
coercive ritualism. Coercive ritualism embraces. the possible patron 
client relations on which are founded the bases for the manoeuvre of 
cadres. Both localism and neo-institutionalism can be subsumed under the 
premise of reactionary subsistence for it assumes the existence of 
confrontations between peasants and cadres as well as the autonomy of 
peasants. 
Disintegrated autonomy gives descriptions of situations currently 
overlooked by empirical researches. The dissociating relationship among 
cadres, peasants and the central and the rural government is a typical 
feature found in areas characterised by a low level of commercialisation 
and a low level of agricultural collectivity. Both clientelism and neo-
institutionalism appear to neglect the possibly respective self-
sustenance of cadres and peasants.^  
l.It has to be noted that localism is different from disintegrated autonomy in spite of 
their seeming similarities. The former one refers to the local collective action 
in an effort to resist central directives felt to be disadvantageous. However, 
disintegrated autonomy connotes the absence of collective action among peasants, 
cadres and mi ddl emen. Their room for manoeuvre only exists to the extent of their 
i ndi vi dual seeki ng for survi val . 
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The socialist China at her transformative stage is being trapped 
between the two poles of outright marketisation and thorough 
dismantlement of collective. If coercive ritualism, disintegrated 
autonomy and reactionary subsistence are reliable descriptions of the 
government-peasant relationship, such stagnancy is plausibly a normal 
situation which will likely persist, rather than a widely believed 
'transformative stage'.* The transformation of the socialist China would 
not be a simple transformation in nature or a once and for all bounce 
forward. 
I. The smoothness of retreat of communism may be overestimated by some authors and the 
difficulties encountered in the stages of retreat are underestimated. For the too-
easi 1 y drawn four phases in the retreat of communism, communist totalitarianism, 
communist authoritarianism, post-communi st authoritarian and post-corarauni st 
pluralism, see Brnezt nski , Z. The nrand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism 
in tin? Twentieth Contury Now York: Mac mi I 1 an, 1990. 
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APPENDIX 
This part gives the sources of the cases and geographical coverage 
of the cases analysed in the text. Basically, the periodicals published 
in Chinese in the University Service Centre in the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong are the main source-of cases. In addition, cases are extracted 
from various articles published in academic journals in English, and 
books on the government-peasant relationship. Interviews with several 
current graduate students of the Chinese University of Hong Kong give 
some useful information. The cases collected nonetheless are rather 
fragmented in nature. Each may deal with issues of a different sort. But 
their implications on the government-peasant relationship is quite 
explicit. The following periodicals are used for the analysis: 
Agriculture, Economy and Society 
Guangdong She Hui Ke Shui 
Guizhou she Hui Ke Shui 
Hebei Xue Kan 
Jiang Huai Xue Kan 
Jiang Huai Lun Tan 
Jiangxi She Hui Ke Xue 
Ningxia She Hui Ke 
Quarterly Journal of the Shanghai Academy 
Sccience, Economy, Society 
She Hui 
She Hui Ke Shui (Gansu) 
Social Sciences in China 
Sociological Studies 
Sociology & Social Research 
Xinjiang She Hui Ke Xue * 
Xue Shu Yan Jiu 
Zhejiang Xue Kan 
Background of the three interviewees (who request to remain anonymous): 
Mr. A : He is the son of a former production team leader in 
HeiLongjiang. Mr. A was brought up and received primary 
education in Heilongjiang. Later,* he went to Lanzhou, provincial 
capital of Gansu for higher education. 
Mr. B : He was brought up in Chengdu, provincial capital in Sichuan and 
received education in Beijing. He has experiences in the period 
of "down to the countryside". 
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Mr. C : He was brought up in Xi'an, provincial capital in Shaanxi and 
received education there. 
The geographical coverage of the cases (the level of analysis is 
county): 
Anhui: Anqing, Lujiang, Wuwei, Chaoxian, Hexian, Quanjiao, Chuxian, • 
Changfeng, Huoqin, Dingyuan, Fengyang, Jiashan, Tianchang, Wuhe, 
Huaiyuan, Guzhen, Jieshou, Fuyang. 
Fujian: Zhangzhou, Longyuanshi, Quanzhou, Putian, Shanmingshi, Nanping. 
Gansu: Linxia, Dingxi, Qinan, Dangchang. 
Guangdong: Lianjiang, Enping, Nanhai, Dongguan, Huiyang, Jiexi. 
Guizhou: Weining, Puding, Anshun, Guiyang, Longli, Guiding, Kaiyang, 
Wengan, Tianzhu, Zunyi. 
Hebei: Yutian, Pingshan. 
Heilongjiang: Mudanjiang. 
Henan: Tangyin, Yanjing, Lankao, Huangchuan. 
Hubei: Zhongxiang. 
Hunan: Changde, Loudi, Anhua, Lianyuan, Lengshuijiang, Longhui, Xinshao. 
Jiangsu: Nanhui, Suzhou, Baoshan, Taicang, Wuxi, Changzhou, Haimen, 
Rugao, Nantong, Kunshan, Changshu, Suqian, Jiading. 
Jiangxi: Nanchang 
Ningxia: Yanchi, Tongxint Jingyuan. 
Shaanxi: Wuqi, Zhidan, Luochuan. 
Shandong: Anqiu, Yexian, Huangxian, Muping, Rongcheng, Dongming. 
Shanxi: Zuoyun, Youyu, Pinglu, Linfen, Zhangzhi. 
Sichuan: Qionglai, Yibin. 
Xinjicing: no specific county. 
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Zhejiang: Qingyuan, Taishun, Cangnan, Pingyang, Wencheng, Ruian, 
Longquan, Ouhai, Wenzhoushi, Dongtou, Shuichang, Yongjia, 
Leqing, Wenling, Xianju, Sanmen, Xinchang, Jiande, Tonglu, 
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